Home Transmission Monopoly market (monopoly). The essence of market monopolization Market monopolization leads to an increase in the range of goods

Monopoly market (monopoly). The essence of market monopolization Market monopolization leads to an increase in the range of goods

The market economy, with its mechanisms for regulating free competition and entrepreneurship, has largely contributed to the formation of the picture of the world that we have today. The advantages of this type of system are undeniable, but this was not always the case. Moreover, until now, some sectors of the economy of different countries have a monopolistic basis. This is the only possible option for their effective functioning. So what is a monopoly? What is its essence?

We reveal the concept

A monopoly is a market situation when a large enterprise or their association, engaged in the production and sale of unique products, dominates the industry. Such an economic entity is protected from competition. He is the only representative of the market producing a certain product.

Since the monopoly enterprise is in privileged conditions of existence and is the only source of supply, there is no need to fear for the size of demand. This gives him the opportunity to independently form prices and plan production processes according to qualitative and quantitative characteristics. Thus, monopolization is the capture of the entire market or its larger share by one large company.

In modern legislation, such activity is defined as the abuse by an economic entity of its position against the economy and existing laws.

Characteristic features of a monopolized market

Among them are the following:

  • There is only one seller.
  • The product or technology is unique and irreplaceable. Therefore, buyers have no choice.
  • There are insurmountable barriers to entry into the market of competitors.
  • The company dictates its price to the market.
  • Legal. When a monopoly is purposefully created by the state, it is under its total control. And in order to avoid the emergence of competition at the legislative level, a ban on the entry of similar enterprises into a particular industry is announced.
  • Natural. Barriers to entry of competitors are formed by themselves. For example, public utilities are regulated by the state, and for completely natural reasons, competition is not allowed here.
  • Economic. This type of barriers in the market is organized by the monopolist itself or they appear due to the political or economic situation in the country.

Types of barriers to entry into a monopolistic market

Reasons for the emergence of monopolies:

  • There are a number of sectors of the economy that are best managed cost-effectively by a single company or state. Such sectors include: energy supply, gas and water supply, pipeline transport, post office, rail transport, metro, etc. Economies of scale in the absence of competition make a monopoly in these industries financially justified.
  • Possession of a unique resource or technology. Monopolization is a temporary phenomenon until competitors catch up with the company that has taken the lead.
  • Reduced demand for the product. A low level of demand also leads to the formation of a natural monopoly, since everyone understands the inexpediency of creating competition due to low demand.
  • Consolidation of the largest companies in the industry. Firms may voluntarily merge to eliminate competitors. A forced merger or even takeover can also occur, when a more successful company buys a smaller or more profitable competitor.

Classification

Monopolization is a multifaceted complex phenomenon, therefore, there are many types of it, depending on what is taken as a basis. The most common classification criteria are as follows.

According to the form of ownership, the types of monopolies are:

  • state;
  • private.

According to the nature and cause of occurrence:

  • Natural. Due to the limited resources or characteristics of the production of goods, it is more economically profitable and more efficient to create a monopoly.

For example, the management of such natural resources as oil and gas is carried out exclusively by the state.

  • Artificial. This type of monopoly arises in the case of a merger of companies or in the absence of competitors.
  • Temporary, when a company is a temporary monopolist as long as it has a unique product or technology and has no competitors. This provision will last until other enterprises begin to produce a similar product.
  • Legal. allowed by the state. Protected from competition by the legal field.

By the level of state regulation:

  • indirectly controlled. They are created by business entities and are under the supervision of the state.
  • Directly adjustable. Monopolies are created and ordered at the will of the state in the public interest.

By territorial character: local, regional, national and transnational.

Types of monopolies - a whole section in economic theory. Due to versatility, there is also a division according to forms. Consider their varieties.

Forms of monopolies

The simplest is a cartel, since economic independence is reserved for each of the participants. The main meaning is reduced to the exchange of information and the conclusion of an agreement on prices and the division of sales markets.

A syndicate is an association of several companies from the same industry, as a result of which each of them retains control over its own production facilities, but commercial activities are carried out by agreement of the parties. As a rule, a common sales department is created to simplify the functioning.

A trust is an association of several companies representing one or more sectors of the economy. There is a merger of production, marketing and financial management. In accordance with the percentage contribution of each of the organizations to the common cause, the distribution of shares, and subsequently profits.

Concern - association of companies from different industries on the basis of diversification. The legal independence of the participants is preserved, while a single financial center is being created. This increases the potential for production development.

A conglomerate is a merger or acquisition of diversified companies for the purpose of unified financial control. Companies can be in completely unrelated industries. The main purpose of this is diversification.

Assessment of the degree of market monopolization

It depends on the predominance of one or another type of relationship in the economy. In order to assess the level of monopolization and competition, the following are distinguished:

  • Market of pure struggle. This is a situation where many companies operate with a variety of products on a mass production scale. Moreover, there are practically no barriers to the entry of new participants in economic relations.
  • Monopolistic competition market. There are many sellers in the industry with an interchangeable differentiated product, so there is a risk that if the price is not adequately overstated, the buyer may go to a cheaper competitor. This is the most common type of market structure today. This includes manufacturers of well-known brands of sportswear, cosmetic brands, etc.

  • Oligopoly. This type of market structure occurs when the number of companies producing similar and interchangeable goods does not exceed five. Barriers to entry are very high. Therefore, there is often, but not always, consistency among competitors. In this case, they can agree to share the sales market among themselves. Examples are companies involved in the production of aircraft, the automotive industry.
  • Monopoly. In this case, there is no competition, this is the exact opposite of the first type of market device.

Monopolization indicators

One of them is the number of manufacturers producing a particular product, and their division into groups depending on size and specialization. To assess the level of monopolization, one also looks at the volume of market share by manufacturers.

Other indicators:

  • Determination of what share of the total market volume falls on small, medium and large enterprises.
  • The Hirschman-Herfindel index as the main monopolization coefficient is expressed as the sum of the squares of the shares of companies as a percentage. The market is not captured when the indicator is below 1800. In this case, the possibility of mergers and acquisitions of companies is allowed. If this coefficient is in the range between 1800 and 2500, then there is a certain risk that a large enterprise will capture too much market share, which will allow it to dictate its rules to the remaining competitors and buyers. In this case, the consent of the state is required for the merger of companies. If the index indicator is over 2500, then any enlargement of the enterprise through takeovers or mergers is prohibited.

Positive aspects: there are a number of sectors of the economy where competition is unacceptable. The presence of a monopoly in these areas contributes to the rational allocation of resources and economies due to the factor of mass production and cost reduction. Control over natural resources, high-tech and military developments, utilities, enterprises with a unique direction should absolutely not be given to private hands. The most effective will be the management of one company.

The main negative consequences of monopolization are related to the lack of competition. From this follows a long list of negative factors affecting the development of the country's economy.

Consequence of monopolization

  1. Setting inflated prices.
  2. Inefficient allocation of resources.
  3. Lack of incentives to upgrade production facilities and introduce new technologies.
  4. Decreased production efficiency.
  5. Risk for an efficiently functioning sector of the economy.


Regulation of monopolies

The state tirelessly monitors the state of the market. It strikes a balance between competition and monopolization. Otherwise, excessive growth in the number of dominant companies can worsen the functioning of the entire industry. Like any other component of the economy, the activity of monopolies is under the control of a specialized authority.
Its main goals are:

  • Price regulation.
  • Creating and maintaining healthy competition.
  • Providing economic freedom to all economic subjects of the market.
  • Formation and maintenance of the unity of the economic space.

Thus, competition and monopolization are two radically different concepts, a counterbalance to each other. However, both have a dual characteristic, which implies that these market structures have both positive and negative sides. Competition is necessary for the progressive development of all sectors of the economy. However, as the practice of most states shows, monopolistic structures are also indispensable.

Monopolization is an economically justified phenomenon in certain market sectors. But without its regulation, a negative impact on the development of the industry is possible. That is why antimonopoly legislation was developed, which allows you to keep the situation under control and maintain a balance between these two types of economic relations.

Monopoly - (from one and Greek Poleo - I sell), an exclusive right in a certain area of ​​the state, organization, firm.

Market monopolization is a situation in the economy when one or several large producers or sellers have an overwhelming advantage in the market in the production and sale of a certain range of goods, which leads to monopolization of prices and the establishment of dictatorship in the market.

Monopolies are large economic associations (cartels, syndicates, trusts, concerns, and so on) that are privately owned (individual, group or joint-stock) and exercise control over industries, markets and the economy based on a high degree of concentration of production and capital in order to establish monopoly prices and extracting monopoly profits. Dominance in the economy is the basis of the influence that monopolies have on all spheres of a country's life. Ultimately, this enables the monopolist to redistribute effective demand in its favor and receive monopoly high profits, which is the main reason for the monopolization of the market.

Modern theory distinguishes three types of monopolies:

  • 1) the monopoly of an individual enterprise;
  • 2) monopoly as an agreement;
  • 3) monopoly based on product differentiation.

It is not easy to achieve a monopoly position in the first way, as evidenced by the very fact of the exclusivity of these entities. In addition, this path to monopoly can be considered "decent", since it provides for a constant increase in performance, achieving an advantage over competitors. More accessible and common is the way of agreement between several large firms, it makes it possible to quickly create a situation where sellers (manufacturers) act on the market as a “united front”, when competition, primarily price, is nullified, the buyer finds himself in uncontested conditions. A monopoly based on product differentiation creates a market of monopolistic competition. Depending on the occurrence, a monopoly is distinguished:

  • * natural;
  • * administrative;
  • * economic.

Let's talk about them in more detail.

Natural monopoly arises due to objective reasons. It reflects a situation where the demand for a given product is best satisfied by one or more firms. It is based on the features of production technologies and customer service. Here competition is impossible or undesirable. An example is energy supply, telephone services, communications, etc. There are a limited number, if not a single, national enterprise in these industries, and therefore, naturally, they have a monopoly position in the market.

Administrative monopoly arises as a result of the actions of state bodies. On the one hand, this is the granting to individual firms of the exclusive right to perform a certain type of activity. On the other hand, these are organizational structures for state-owned enterprises, when they unite and report to different heads, ministries, associations. Here, as a rule, enterprises of the same industry are grouped. They act on the market as one economic entity and there is no competition between them. An example is the economy of the former Soviet Union. It belonged to the most monopolized in the world. It was precisely the administrative monopoly that dominated there, primarily the monopoly of ministries and departments.

Economic monopoly is the most common. Its appearance is due to economic reasons, it develops on the basis of the laws of economic development. We are talking about entrepreneurs who have managed to win a monopoly position in the market. There are two paths leading to it. The first is the successful development of the enterprise, the constant increase in its scale through the concentration of capital. The second (faster) is based on the processes of centralization of capital, that is, on the voluntary association or absorption of bankrupt winners. In one way or another, or with the help of both, the enterprise reaches such proportions when it begins to dominate the market.

A special type of monopolies is international monopolies. The economic basis for the emergence and development of international monopolies is the high degree of socialization of capitalist production and the internationalization of economic life. There are two types of international monopolies. The first is transnational monopolies. They are national in capital and control, but international in scope. For example: the American oil concern "Standardoil of New Jersey", which has enterprises in more than 40 countries, assets abroad account for 56% of their total amount, sales volume 68%, profits 52%. The vast majority of the production facilities and sales organizations of the Swiss food concern Nestlé are located in other countries. Only 2-3% of the total turnover comes from Switzerland.

The second variety is actually international monopolies. A feature of international trusts and concerns is the international dispersal of share capital and the multinational composition of the core of the trust or concern. For example: the Anglo-Dutch chemical-food concern "Unilever", the German-Belgian trust of photochemical goods "Agfa-Gevert".

There are also five main forms of monopoly associations. Based on the monopolization of the sphere of circulation, the simplest forms of monopolistic associations arose - cartels and syndicates.

A cartel is an association of several enterprises of the same sphere of production, whose participants retain ownership of the means of production and the product produced, industrial and commercial independence, and agree on the share of each in the total production volume, prices, markets.

A syndicate is an association of a number of enterprises in the same industry, the participants of which retain funds for the means of production, but lose ownership of the product produced, which means that they retain production, but lose their commercial independence. In syndicates, the sale of goods is carried out by a common sales office.

More complex forms of monopolistic associations arise when the process of monopolization extends to the sphere of direct production. On this basis, such a higher form of monopolistic associations as a trust appears.

A trust is an association of a number of enterprises in one or more industries, the participants of which lose ownership of the means of production and the product produced. That is, production, marketing, finance, management are combined, and for the amount of invested capital, the owners of individual enterprises receive trust shares, which give them the right to take part in management and appropriate a corresponding part of the trust's profit.

The next form of monopolistic associations is a diversified concern.

A diversified concern is an association of tens and even hundreds of enterprises in various industries, transport, trade, whose participants lose ownership of the means of production and the product produced, and the main company exercises financial control over other participants in the association.

But monopolistic associations cannot be formed out of the blue, reasons are needed for this, therefore economic theory identifies three reasons for the existence of monopolies:

First reason: If the production of any volume of output by one firm is cheaper than its production by two or more firms, then the industry is said to be a natural monopoly. And the reason here is economies of scale, the more products are produced, the lower their cost.

The second reason is that a single firm has control over some rare and extremely important resources, either in the form of raw materials or in the form of patented or secret knowledge. For example, De Beers' diamond monopoly relied on control of raw materials.

Third reason: government restriction. Monopolies exist because they buy or are granted the exclusive right to sell some good. In some cases, the state reserves the right to a monopoly; Gazprom has a monopoly on gas supplies to Europe. In a number of countries, only state monopolies can sell tobacco.

Monopolies, thanks to the high level of concentration of economic resources, create opportunities for accelerating technical progress. However, these opportunities are realized in cases where such acceleration contributes to the extraction of high monopoly profits. Joseph Schumpeter and other economists have argued that large firms with significant power are desirable in economics because they accelerate technological change, since firms with monopoly power can spend their monopoly profits on research to protect or strengthen their monopoly power. power. By engaging in research, they provide benefits both to themselves and to society as a whole. But there is no convincing evidence that monopolies play a particularly important role in accelerating technological progress, since monopolies can delay the development of technical progress if it threatens their profits.

On the whole, it is difficult to speak of any public benefit brought by monopolies. However, it is impossible to completely do without monopolies: natural monopolies are practically indispensable when the characteristics of the factors of production used by them do not allow the presence of more than one owner, or the limited resources lead to the unification of their owners. Either way, the lack of competition stifles the development of an industry in the long run, since a monopoly creates the greatest resource inefficiency than firms of other types of imperfect competition or almost perfect competitors.

INTRODUCTION .................................................. ................................................. ...... 3

I. THEORETICAL PART............................................................... .............................. 4

1.1. The concept of monopoly .............................................................. ................................. 4

1.2. Types of monopoly .............................................................. ...................................... 4

1.3. Reasons for the existence of monopolies .................................................................. ...... 7

1.4. Monopoly Pricing and Monopoly Output....................................................... 8

1.5. Costs and Efficiency of Monopolies .............................................................. ... 9

1.6. Natural monopoly .................................................................. ........................ thirteen

II. ANALYTICAL PART.................................................................. ....................... eighteen

2.1. International monopolies .................................................................. ................. eighteen

2.2. State control over monopolistic activity in countries with developed economies .............................................................. ............................................ eighteen

2.3. Natural monopolies in the Russian market and their reformation...... 20

2.4. Tariff regulation of natural monopolies and the impact on efficiency .............................................................. ................................................. ........................... 25

2.5. Prospects for the restructuring of natural monopolies and the impact on the efficiency of the economy.................................................................. .................................... 31

2.6. Presence of natural monopolies in the Russian market. Their share, impact on the national economy .............................................. ................................. 33

2.6.1. Regulation of the activities of natural monopolies .............................. 33

2.6.2. Maximizing the level of production............................................... 34

2.7. Ensuring self-sufficiency .............................................................. .............. 35

2.8. Reforming the structure of Russian natural monopolies.... 36

2.9. National or private? .............................................................. ................... 38

CONCLUSION................................................. ................................................. 40

LIST OF USED LITERATURE.................................................................. 42

INTRODUCTION

If you pay attention to monopolistic entities, then these are individual large enterprises, associations of enterprises, business partnerships that produce a significant amount of products of a certain type, due to which they occupy a dominant position in the market; get the opportunity to influence the pricing process, achieving the most favorable prices for themselves; receive higher (monopoly) profits.

Consequently, the main sign of a monopoly formation (monopoly) is the occupation of a monopoly position. The latter is defined as the dominant position of the entrepreneur, which enables him, alone or together with other entrepreneurs, to limit competition in the market for a particular product.

A monopoly position is desirable for every entrepreneur or enterprise, because it allows you to avoid a number of problems and risks associated with competition: to take a privileged position in the market, concentrating certain economic power in its hands; influence other market participants, impose their conditions on them. It can be assumed that monopolists impose their personal interests on their counterparties, and sometimes on society.

Therefore, in this paper I would like to consider the monopolization of the market and the impact on the Russian economy. A special place in this work is occupied by natural monopolies. A natural monopoly arises when output above the required level is accompanied by economies of scale. In this case, for any volume of output, the costs are minimal when the products are produced by a single firm. In other words, for any volume of output, an increase in the number of manufacturing firms leads to a decrease in the volume of output of each and to an increase in average total costs. Thus, in the work we will be convinced of the inefficient output and the non-equilibrium price of the monopolist. Therefore, the monopoly from the point of view of society is inefficient. Within the framework of the problem under discussion, I would like to note in the work such aspects of the study as the concept of monopoly and its significance for the economy (social costs), the concept of natural monopoly and the impact on the Russian economy, as well as the possible reform of monopolistic structures to achieve efficiency.

I. THEORETICAL PART

1.1. The concept of monopoly

Before proceeding to the consideration of this topic, it is necessary to consider the concept of monopoly and the essence of monopoly power in the market.

A monopoly is a firm that is the sole supplier of a product that has no close substitutes. A firm has a monopoly if it is the only supplier of a product that has no close substitutes. The main reason for the emergence of a monopoly is market entry barriers that prevent other firms from competing with the monopolist. Barriers to entry into the market, in turn, arise in the following cases:

The key resource of production is owned by a single firm.

The government granted exclusive rights to the production of certain products to one firm.

Production costs are such that maximum production efficiency is possible if there is a single producer in the market.

The objective basis of monopoly is the dominant position of an economic entity in the market, which allows it to have a decisive influence on competition, overprice and reduce production compared to the theoretically possible level, and hinder access to the market for other economic entities. Ultimately, this enables the monopolist to redistribute effective demand in its favor and receive monopoly high profits. Competitive markets generally work well, but markets where either buyers or sellers can manipulate prices do not. In a market where one seller controls supply, output will be low and prices high. Monopoly is an extreme form of imperfect competition. A seller has monopoly power if he can raise the price of his product by limiting his own output. In monopoly markets, there is an entry barrier that makes it impossible for any new seller to enter the market. A firm with monopoly power pursues a policy of price discrimination, that is, it sells the same product to different groups of consumers at different prices. But for this, a monopoly firm must be able to reliably divide its market, focusing on different demand elasticity for different consumers, and skillfully separate the “cheap” market from the “expensive” one.

1.2. Types of monopoly

The type of monopolies depends on the market structure and the form of competition.

There are different types of monopolies, which can be classified into three main ones: natural, administrative and economic .

Natural monopoly arises due to objective reasons. It reflects a situation where the demand for a given product is best satisfied by one or more firms. It is based on the features of production technologies and customer service. Here competition is impossible or undesirable. An example is energy supply, telephone services, communications, etc. There are a limited number, if not a single, national enterprise in these industries, and therefore, naturally, they have a monopoly position in the market.

Administrative monopoly arises as a result of the actions of state bodies. On the one hand, this is the granting to individual firms of the exclusive right to perform a certain type of activity. On the other hand, these are organizational structures for state-owned enterprises, when they unite and report to different central administrations, ministries, and associations. Here, as a rule, enterprises of the same industry are grouped. They act on the market as one economic entity and there is no competition between them. The economy of the former Soviet Union was one of the most monopolized in the world. It was precisely the administrative monopoly that dominated there, primarily the monopoly of all-powerful ministries and departments. Moreover, there was an absolute state monopoly on the organization and management of the economy, which was based on the dominant state ownership of the means of production.

Economic monopoly is the most common. Its appearance is due to economic reasons, it develops on the basis of the laws of economic development. We are talking about entrepreneurs who have managed to win a monopoly position in the market. There are two paths leading to it. The first is the successful development of the enterprise, the constant increase in its scale through the concentration of capital. The second (faster) is based on the processes of centralization of capital, that is, on the voluntary association or absorption of bankrupt winners. In one way or another, or with the help of both, the enterprise reaches such proportions when it begins to dominate the market.

What is the reason for the emergence and development of monopolistic tendencies? There are two points of view on this issue in the economic literature. According to the first, monopoly is interpreted as random, not characteristic of a market economy. As for the other point of view, monopoly formations are defined as natural. One of the advocates of such views is the English economist A. Pigou. He insists that "monopolistic power does not arise by chance." It is the logical conclusion of the strategy of enterprises. To paraphrase a well-known expression, we can say that all roads lead to monopoly. The principle of economic benefit, formulated by A. Smith, forces enterprises to constantly look for opportunities to increase their profits. One of them, the most attractive and reliable, is the creation or achievement of a monopoly position. Thus, we can conclude that monopolistic tendencies in the economy follow from the law of profit maximization.

Another driving force behind the actions of entrepreneurs in this direction is the law of concentration of production and capital. As you know, the effect of this law is observed at all stages of the development of market relations. It is driven by competition. In order to survive in such a struggle, to get big profits, entrepreneurs are forced to introduce new equipment and increase the scale of production. At the same time, several larger ones are separated from the mass of medium and small enterprises. When this happens, the largest entrepreneurs have an alternative: either to continue losing competition among themselves, or to come to an agreement on the scale of production, prices, markets, etc. As a rule, they choose the second option, which leads to collusion between them, which is one of the main signs of the monopolization of the economy. Thus, the conclusion suggests itself that the emergence of monopoly enterprises is due to the progress of the productive forces, the realization of the advantages of a large enterprise over a small one.

Modern theory distinguishes three types of monopolies:

1) monopoly of an individual enterprise;

2) monopoly as an agreement;

3) monopoly based on product differentiation.

It is not easy to achieve a monopoly position in the first way, as evidenced by the very fact of the exclusivity of these entities. In addition, this path to monopoly can be considered "decent", since it provides for a constant increase in performance, achieving an advantage over competitors.

More accessible and common is the way of agreement between several large firms. It makes it possible to quickly create a situation where sellers (manufacturers) act on the market as a “united front”, when competition, primarily price, is reduced to nothing, the buyer finds himself in uncontested conditions.

There are five main forms of monopoly associations. Monopolies monopolize all spheres of social reproduction: direct production, exchange, distribution and consumption. Based on the monopolization of the sphere of circulation, the simplest forms of monopolistic associations arose - cartels and syndicates.

Cartel - this is an association of several enterprises of the same sphere of production, the participants of which retain ownership of the means of production and the product produced, industrial and commercial independence, and agree on the share of each in the total production volume, prices, markets.

Syndicate - this is an association of a number of enterprises of the same industry, the participants of which retain funds for the means of production, but lose ownership of the product produced, which means that they retain production, but lose their commercial independence. In syndicates, the sale of goods is carried out by a common sales office.

More complex forms of monopolistic associations arise when the process of monopolization extends to the sphere of direct production. On this basis, such a higher form of monopolistic associations as a trust appears.

Trust - this is an association of a number of enterprises of one or several industries, the participants of which lose their ownership of the means of production and the product produced (industrial and commercial independence). That is, production, marketing, finance, management are combined, and for the amount of invested capital, the owners of individual enterprises receive trust shares, which give them the right to take part in management and appropriate a corresponding part of the trust's profit.

Diversified concern - this is an association of tens and even hundreds of enterprises in various industries, transport, trade, whose participants lose ownership of the means of production and the product produced, and the main company exercises financial control over other participants in the association.

In the 60s in the United States and some capital countries appeared and began to develop conglomerates , that is, monopolistic associations formed by absorbing the profits of diversified enterprises that do not have technical and production unity.

Experience shows that monopolies, having monopolized a certain industry and seized strong and monopoly positions, sooner or later lose the dynamics of development and efficiency. This is explained by the fact that the advantages of large-scale production are not absolute, they bring an increase in profitability only up to a certain point.

In general, any monopoly can exist only with imperfect competition. A monopoly market assumes that a given product is produced by only one firm (the industry consists of one firm) and it has very high price control.

The market is more loyal to the oligopoly, which can be divided into two types: the first type of oligopoly is industries with exactly the same products and a large size of enterprises. The second type of oligopoly is a situation where there are several sellers selling differentiated goods. In this case, there is partial control over prices. The market of monopolistic competition with product differentiation assumes that the buyer prefers a certain type of product: it is this variety, quality, packaging, brand, level of service, etc. that attracts him. Signs of such a market: many producers, many real or imagined product differences, very little price control.

1.3. Reasons for the existence of monopolies.

There are several reasons for the existence of monopolies.

First reason: "natural monopoly". If the production of any volume of output by one firm is cheaper than its production by two or more firms, then the industry is said to be a natural monopoly. And the reason here is economies of scale - the more products are produced, the lower their cost.

The second reason : A single firm has control over some rare and extremely important resource, either in the form of raw materials or in the form of patented or secret knowledge. Example: De Beers' diamond monopoly relies on control over raw materials; Xerox controlled the process of making copies, called xerography, because it had knowledge of technology, in some cases protected by patents.

Third reason: state restriction. Monopolies exist because they buy or are granted the exclusive right to sell some good. In some cases, the state reserves the right to a monopoly; in a number of countries, only state monopolies can sell tobacco.

1.4. Monopoly pricing and monopolist issue

In this part, we will demonstrate the traditional pricing of monopoly in order to understand the mechanism of regulation of monopoly prices and the reaction of monopolists.

Figure 1.1. the short-run average and marginal cost curves of a monopoly firm are shown. The demand for the monopolist's product and the marginal revenue from it are also shown. Monopoly output is denoted as Qm, which is the output corresponding to the point where the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves intersect. To induce buyers to purchase this quantity of goods, the monopolist sets a price equal to Pm.

At this price and the amount of output, the monopolist receives a profit per unit of goods (Rm - ACm). The total output is equal to Qm. The total economic profit is, therefore, (Pm -ACm)Qm.

How much profit the monopolist actually earns depends both on costs and on the demand for his product. If fortune turns against you, you may not find anyone willing to buy the rights to your concerts, even if you offer them at a reduced price. That's show business: you can be praised today and ostracized tomorrow. Having a monopoly does not guarantee that you will make a profit. Monopolists can and do exit an industry when the demand for the product they are selling decreases. Owning the only genuine Turkish bath in the city will be unprofitable if the price is less than the average cost for the output at which MR = MC.

If the demand and marginal revenue of the product supplied by the monopolist decrease, then it may not be possible to earn a profit. If the price corresponding to output at which MR = MC falls below average cost, the monopoly will incur losses. This is shown in Graph B (Figure 1.1). In the United States of America, in recent years, Amtrak has enjoyed a monopoly on passenger rail services on many routes. However, even despite this, the company suffered losses.

Rice. 1.1. Monopoly price and output

The monopoly firm maximizes profit by producing the quantity of the good corresponding to the point where MR = MC. She then sets the price Pm. which is required to induce buyers to purchase a quantity of good Qm. Possession of a monopoly, however, does not guarantee a profit. In option A, the monopolist earns an economic profit. In option B, there is not enough demand to make a profit at the point where MR - MC. The firm incurs economic losses because< АС.

1.5. Costs and Efficiency of Monopolies

How to evaluate the efficiency of a monopolistic market? We have seen that a monopoly, unlike a competitive firm, charges a price in excess of marginal cost. From the point of view of consumers, a monopoly is undesirable. On the other hand, a monopoly high price is very attractive to the owners of the company. How do the benefits of the owners of the firm compare with the costs that consumers are forced to bear? Perhaps a monopoly is beneficial from the point of view of society as a whole?

We use total surplus as a measure of economic well-being. Recall that total surplus is equal to the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the amount consumers are willing to pay for a good and the amount actually paid. Producer surplus is the revenue received from a product sold minus the cost of producing it. In our case, we have a manufacturer in the singular - a monopolist.

The balance of supply and demand in a competitive market is not only a natural, but also a desirable result of its functioning. The "invisible hand" of the market ensures the allocation of resources that maximizes the amount of total surplus. Since a monopoly results in an allocation of resources that is different from that of a competitive market, the monopoly market must, in some way, fail to maximize economic welfare.

Irrecoverable loss

We begin our analysis by examining the behavior of a monopoly as if it were run by a benevolent planner who is interested not only in the profits of the firm's owners but also in the profits of its consumers and seeks to maximize the total surplus equal to the sum of producer surplus (profit) and consumer surplus. Remember that the total surplus is equal to the value of the good to the consumer minus the cost of producing the good to the monopoly producer.

Rice. 1.2 shows us the determination of the volume of production by our "goodwill specialist". The demand curve reflects the value of a product to consumers, that is, the amount they are willing to pay for the product. The marginal cost curve reflects the costs of the monopolist. In this way, socially efficient output is at the intersection of the demand curve and the marginal cost curve. At volumes below this level, the value of the good to consumers exceeds the marginal cost of its production, therefore, an increase in output leads to an increase in total surplus. Above this level, marginal cost exceeds the value of the product to consumers, which means that with a decrease in output, the total surplus will increase.

Rice. 1.2. Efficient production level

If a monopoly were indeed run by a benevolent planner, it would achieve efficient output by setting a price at the intersection of the demand and marginal cost curves. That is, a "goodwill specialist", like a competitive firm and unlike a profit-maximizing monopoly, would charge a price equal to marginal cost. Since such a price would give consumers accurate information about the cost of producing a good, consumers would purchase an efficient quantity of the good.

We can estimate the welfare impact of a monopoly by comparing the output the monopolist chooses with the output that our planner would choose. The monopolist decides to supply such a volume of output, which corresponds to the point of intersection of the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve; the planner, on the other hand, chooses the amount of output corresponding to the point of intersection of the demand curve with the marginal cost curve. Rice. 1.3 shows us the difference in approaches: the monopolist's decision is less than the socially efficient output.

The inefficiency of a monopoly is also considered in terms of the monopolist's price. Since the market demand curve expresses an inverse relationship between the price and quantity supplied of a good, output below the socially efficient output corresponds to a price that exceeds the socially efficient price. When the monopolist charges a price above marginal cost, some potential consumers who value the good above the marginal cost of production but below the monopolist's price refuse to buy it. This is the essence of inefficiency, because for such consumers the value of this product is higher than the cost of its acquisition. Thus, monopoly pricing is to some extent an obstacle to mutually beneficial trade.

Rice. 1.3. Monopoly inefficiency

The inefficiency of a monopoly can also be measured (Figure 1.3). Recall that the demand curve reflects the value of a product to consumers, and the marginal cost curve reflects the costlessness of a monopoly producer. Thus, the area of ​​the return loss triangle between the demand curve and the marginal cost curve is equal to the reduction in total surplus due to monopoly pricing. The deadweight loss caused by a monopoly is similar to the deadweight loss due to taxation. Indeed, a monopolist is like a secret tax collector. The imposition of a tax on a good drives a wedge between consumers' willingness to pay for a good (the demand curve) and the producer's costs (the supply curve). Since the monopoly, exercising power over the market, sets a price above marginal cost, it drives in the same "strut". In both cases, the forcible introduction of the wedge causes sales to fall below the optimum for society. The difference between wedges is that the government receives tax revenues, while the private firm receives monopoly profits.

Monopoly profit: a cost to society?

It is hard to avoid the temptation not to accuse monopolies of "profiting at the expense of society." Indeed, a monopoly firm earns higher profits due to its power over the market. An economic analysis of a monopoly shows, however, that its profit by itself is by no means always a social problem.

Welfare in a monopoly market, as in any other, includes the welfare of producers and the welfare of consumers. Every time the consumer pays an extra dollar to the monopolist, the producer's welfare increases by the same amount. But this "leakage" of money from the consumers of the commodity to the monopoly does not change the total market surplus. In other words, monopoly profit does not in itself mean a reduction in the size of the economic pie; just a larger piece goes to the supplier, and the consumer has to be content with little. If you do not consider (for some special reasons) consumers to be more worthy subjects of the market - and such a judgment is outside the scope of the concept of economic efficiency - monopoly profit is not a problem for society.

The monopoly market problem is related to the fact that the level of production is below the value that maximizes the total surplus. Irrevocable loss is a measure of reducing the size of the economic "pie". Decreased efficiency is an inevitable consequence of a monopoly high price: at a price above marginal cost, the volume of consumption of a good decreases. However, the profit that the sold products bring does not create problems. The problem is inefficiently low output." Or, to put it another way, if the high price of a monopoly did not discourage some consumers from buying the good, it would simply increase producer surplus by exactly the same amount as consumer surplus decreases; total surplus would remain the same as if the aforementioned fine-hearted planner had run the monopoly.

There can be one exception to this conclusion, however. Suppose that the monopoly incurs additional costs to maintain its exclusive position. For example, a government-created monopoly incurs the cost of expanding the ranks of lobbyists needed to extend its monopoly rights. In this case, it can use part of its monopoly profit to cover additional costs. Then the social costs of the monopoly include, along with the irretrievable loss arising from the discrepancy between the price and marginal costs, these unreasonable costs.

1.6. natural monopoly

Sometimes the effect of economies of scale in production can be so large that it determines the uniqueness of the producer of the good (see the dotted curve in Figure 1.4).

Rice. 1.4. Scale effect and industry structure

In other words, in some industries, the rule applies without any restrictions: the larger the scale of production, the lower the costs. This creates the prerequisites for the strengthening of a single manufacturer in such an industry.

A natural monopoly is a monopoly arising from the fact that a single firm provides the market with some good or service at a lower cost than two or more firms would do.

When a firm's average total cost curve is constantly decreasing, there is a so-called natural monopoly. In this case, if production is distributed among two or more firms, each firm produces less output, and average total cost increases. As a result, for any volume of output, costs are minimal when the producer is a single firm. A striking example of a natural monopoly is the water supply of settlements. To provide water to the inhabitants of the city, the company must build a water supply network that covers all of its buildings. If two or more firms competed to offer a given service, each would have to incur fixed costs for the construction of its water pipeline. The average total cost of water supply is minimal when the entire market is served by a single firm. In some cases, one of the factors determining the emergence of a natural monopoly is the size of the market.

This state of the market is a monopoly - a situation fraught with a number of major problems for the economy. In this case, however, a monopoly arises from natural causes: the technological features of production are such that a single manufacturer serves the market more efficiently than several competing firms are able to do. Economists call such a monopoly natural or technological. Its classic example is various types of infrastructure. Infrastructure is an area of ​​supply chain management that includes:

1) networks through which products (people) are supplied between economic agents remote from each other;

2) activities for the operation of these networks.

It is not difficult to understand that the effectiveness of a natural monopoly in infrastructure sectors is ensured by the technological unity of the network at its disposal. Indeed, it is not economically feasible to build two alternative airports or lay two competing railways next to each other. It is absurd to install several taps in apartments, from which water supplied by different companies will flow!

From an economic point of view, this will mean a multiple increase in average fixed costs. Thus, in the conditions of the existence of a natural monopoly, the cost of the power supply network is distributed in the form of costs for all sold electricity. If there are two parallel networks, then their cost will double accordingly. The flow of energy passing through each will fall by half. And the fixed costs attributable to each kilowatt of energy purchased by the consumer will increase by 2 times!

It makes no sense to break up natural monopolies. For example, even if the railway network, which is monopoly operated by one company, is divided into several regional sections and transferred to the ownership of independent companies, the natural source of monopoly will still not be eliminated. It will still be possible to drive from city A to city B along one road.

As a result, the single market of transportation services will be divided into a number of local ones. Instead of one monopoly, several will arise (each in its own area). The level of competition will not increase. Moreover, due to the difficulty of harmonizing the work of regional companies, the overall costs of the railway industry may increase.

The macroeconomic aspect of the problem is also important. Infrastructure networks, which are natural monopolies, ensure the interconnection of economic entities and the integrity of the national economic system. It is not for nothing that they say that in modern Russia the economic unity of the country is not least determined by unified railways, common electricity and gas supply.

Summary: both microeconomic analysis and macroeconomic considerations show that the destruction of natural monopolies is unacceptable. Does this mean that the state should refrain from interfering in the activities of natural monopolies? By no means!

The impact of natural monopolies on the reformed

Russian economy

Russia has not escaped the negative impact of industries-natural monopolies in market conditions. There are 4,000 monopoly enterprises in Russian industry, and their products account for 7% of the total. Of these, natural monopolies - 500.

With the general decline in production in Russia, the demand for products and services of industries - natural monopolies, with the exception of communications industries, has been constantly declining. These industries are extremely capital-intensive, a significant part of their costs is fixed. As a result, the share of fixed costs in the price of a unit of production grew. In addition, until recently, natural monopoly entities financed investments to a large extent from internal sources (investment and stabilization funds formed at the expense of cost and profit), which determined an excessive burden on tariffs.

Practically in all industries, cross-subsidization of some consumer groups at the expense of others continued. Low tariffs for the population and budgetary organizations were subsidized by industrial and commercial consumers. For example, in railway transport, losses in passenger traffic are covered by freight rates.

In 1996 - 2000 sectoral prices of Russian natural monopolies grew at a faster rate than in other sectors of the economy. They approached the world level, and in some cases (for example, international telephone tariffs) surpassed them. Consumers began to put pressure on the government to the point of demanding a price freeze.

The rapid and significant rise in prices in the electric power industry, the gas industry, the communications industries and the railway transport made it necessary to raise the question of the reasonableness of costs (wage costs, social benefits, investment activities) and the compliance of the quality of the products and services offered with the price level. In all industries containing natural monopoly segments, wages exceeded the average for the economy and their employees enjoyed greater social benefits compared to other industries.

Given the fundamental nature of these industries, it is obvious that the rise in prices for their products was the most powerful factor in macroeconomic inflation, which is rightly characterized by economists as cost-push inflation.

However, it cannot be unequivocally stated that during the years of transition to the market, natural monopoly industries ensured their prosperity at the expense of the rest of the economy. The consequence of price discrimination - catastrophic defaults - hit its own source the hardest.

According to the sectoral structures included in the system of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the debt of debtors for settlements and payments to electric power enterprises amounted to 12.9 trillion rubles by August 1, 1998. rub. and continued to increase further by an average of 36 billion rubles. per day, half of the released energy was not paid on time. The Ministry of Economy submitted to the Government of the Russian Federation a draft decision providing for the implementation of an earlier agreement between the basic industries, energy and transport on joint actions to stabilize prices and tariffs and improve settlements between enterprises. The project was not accepted.

RAO "UES of Russia" then believed that it was necessary to bring the maximum number of generating sources to the federal wholesale electricity and capacity market in the expectation that electricity producers would be involved in competition, which would lead to finding ways to reduce production costs and reduce the cost of energy (reducing tariffs ).

These calculations of the “romantics of the market” from RAO “UES of Russia” are not destined to come true for the simple reason that regional AO-energos are monopolists, at least in relation to consumers in their region, and therefore do not feel the need for competition. No less important is the circumstance that a competitive market can only arise if there are spare capacities. Their level in Russia is 3% (against ~ 30% in the US and Germany) and it is not enough even to compensate for seasonal and daily consumption peaks. The latter are covered by interregional flows, which protects the European part of Russia from massive consumer outages due to a critical drop in frequency in the power system.

By November 2000, consumer defaults had reached $27 trillion. rubles, and already 86% of the supplied electricity was not paid in a timely manner. It is clear that the most important role in this mechanism of pumping receivables belonged to the tariff policy of the industry. In addition, the high price of electricity affects the cost of industrial products, which is why the power industry itself suffers. By the end of 2000, 70% of electricity supplied was paid for in the form of barter transactions. Now the goods of debtors received as payment for electricity are themselves subject to sale through a network of resellers.

By August 1, 2001, the overdue receivables of electricity consumers amounted to 63.2 trillion. rubles, gas - 8.7 trillion. rubles, railways and oil pipeline transport - 65.3 trillion. rub. [Goskomstat of the Russian Federation], which in total exceeds 56% of all non-payments in the Russian economy.

As a result of the government's tighter regulatory influence on natural monopoly prices in the first half of 2001, their growth was significantly limited. The results were not long in coming: since the beginning of the summer, a sharp reduction in inflation has been achieved.

However, the strict containment of tariff growth, according to industry experts, has led to a sharp deterioration in the financial condition of natural monopoly industries. At the same time, in the context of the secrecy of financial information and without an independent audit of the relevant enterprises, it is difficult to support or refute such conclusions. One way or another, in a number of cases, natural monopolies themselves need protection from unreasonable pressure from certain political forces, which leads to undermining the financial stability of these industries vital for the state.

II. ANALYTICAL PART

2.1. International monopolies

A special type of monopolies is international monopolies. The economic basis for the emergence and development of international monopolies is the high degree of socialization of capitalist production and the internationalization of economic life. There are two types of international monopolies. The first is transnational monopolies. They are national in capital and control, but international in scope. For example: the American oil concern "Standard Oil of New Jersey", which has enterprises in more than 40 countries, assets abroad account for 56% of their total amount, sales volume 68%, profits 52%. The vast majority of the production facilities and sales organizations of the Swiss food concern Nestlé are located in other countries. Only 2-3% of the total turnover comes from Switzerland. The second variety is actually international monopolies. A feature of international trusts and concerns is the international dispersal of share capital and the multinational composition of the core of the trust or concern. For example: the Anglo-Dutch chemical-food concern "Unilever", the German-Belgian trust of photochemical goods "Agfa-Gevert". Their number is not significantly large, since the combination of capital of different nationality is fraught with great difficulties: differences in the legislation of countries, double taxation, opposition from any government, etc. The main forms of association: the establishment by monopolies of different countries of a joint company in the form of an independently existing trust or concern; the acquisition by one monopoly of a controlling interest in a foreign monopoly; direct merger of assets of firms from different countries (de jure merger); association of companies of different nationalities through "quasi-mergers". The latter is carried out by an exchange of shares between firms retaining legal independence, either through the mutual appointment of administrators, or through the collective ownership of shares in joint companies. This type of merger is the most common form of formation of international trusts and concerns. They help multinational firms that combine operational activities not only avoid double taxation, but also maintain formal independence, corporate structure, individual production and marketing characteristics, their own trademarks, the former location of the headquarters of parent companies and belonging to the national legislation of their country. .

2.2. State control over monopolistic activities in advanced economies

The implementation of the provisions of the antimonopoly legislation abroad is carried out in an administrative, judicial or mixed manner. In the latter case, the decisions of the administrative authorities may be appealed to the courts.

The situation with state control over monopolistic activity is most complicated in Great Britain. Features of the development of the UK antitrust law led to the creation of two systems of control over monopolies. In the first, based on fair trade and competition laws, the Fair Trade Office, the Monopoly Commission, and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry play a key role. The second system of control provided for by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act is that the Court of Restrictive Practices plays a key role. The Fair Trade Office keeps various records of abuses of dominance, informs the government of its decisions and, if necessary, initiates the following proceedings: refer cases of a monopoly situation in an industry to the Monopoly Commission, supervise alleged mergers of enterprises, refer cases of cartel agreements to the Restrictive Practice Court, sues for the establishment and maintenance of resale prices. It should also be noted that the activities of the Office in determining competition policy are advisory in nature.

The main task of the Commission on Monopolies and Mergers is to investigate and draw up reports on the existence (or the possibility of occurrence) of a monopoly situation or the implementation of a merger of enterprises. In the event that the Commission on Monopolies comes to a conclusion about the violation of public interests, the Secretary of State has broad powers to apply various measures to influence the offender: making decisions on the termination of the contract, prohibitions in the supply of goods, binding transactions, discrimination, prohibition or restriction mergers, on the division of enterprises by selling any of their parts or in some other way).

The role of the British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in regulating monopolies and competition is very significant. Since the conclusions in the reports of the Commission on Monopolies are advisory in nature, the final decision on questions on monopoly situations or anti-competitive practices is carried out by the Secretary of State or other ministers. In addition, the Secretary of State has the power to grant exceptions to restrictive trade practices laws based on the economic insignificance of the relevant cartel agreements.

In the United States, the main work of state control of monopolistic activity is carried out by the antitrust division of the Department of Justice, which is empowered to initiate legal proceedings against persons who violate antitrust laws. In addition to the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission carries out state control over compliance with antitrust laws. At the same time, it should be noted that the main burden in carrying out these activities falls on federal courts and, first of all, on the US Supreme Court, which assesses the legality or invalidity of certain restrictive conditions in contracts or business methods.

In Germany, state regulation of market relations, which leads to mitigation of the negative consequences of excessive monopolization, is carried out by the so-called cartel authorities. These authorities include the Federal Cartel Office, the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and the higher authorities of the Länder. They are joined by the Commission on Monopolies, created to provide opinions on the concentration of enterprises in the FRG. The activities of industrial and professional associations in drawing up competition rules for their industries can be recognized as self-regulation of competitive relations by private business. Cartel authorities may conduct administrative proceedings, proceedings for the recovery of administrative fines or investigations against enterprises, cartels, industrial or professional associations. In the course of administrative office work, in particular, issues of permitting or prohibiting cartel agreements, recognizing agreements on mergers of enterprises as invalid, and prohibiting illegal behavior of enterprises dominating the market are resolved.

In France, control over monopolistic activity is entrusted to the Competition Council, the Ministry of Economy and the courts of general jurisdiction. The Competition Council is considered to be an independent administrative body, on whose decisions the Minister of Economy cannot veto. He performs advisory functions on behalf of various institutions and organizations, and in certain cases he himself imposes appropriate sanctions. An important component of the control of monopolistic practices in France is the verification of economic concentration in the market. At the initiative of the Minister of Economy, the Competition Council may examine any concentration plan or any concentration of enterprises that could harm competition, in particular the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the market.

2.3. Natural monopolies in the Russian market and their reform

1. Power industry. The formation of RAO "UES of Russia" in the form of a joint-stock company dates back to November 1992, when the capacities of over 700 power plants (HPP, GRES, TPP) and the Unified Energy System were combined. The main purpose of the formation of RAO was the formation of a wholesale electricity market. When RAO was created, about 50 of the newest power plants - more than half of the total capacity - were withdrawn from the territorial AO-energos and entered into the federal ownership of RAO "UES of Russia". In the capital structure of RAO "UES of Russia", the state owns 52.6% of shares, while foreign investors account for 30.7%. RAO "UES of Russia" controls 77.7% of the total capacity of the country's power plants. The company consists of 72 regional AO-energos. In the capital of 53 of them RAO has 50% or more shares, in the rest - less than 50%. The company's fixed assets are estimated at $400 billion, the holding's market capitalization is about $13 billion. Owning most of the energy capacity, RAO "UES of Russia" is the owner of the entire network of power lines in the country. Among the plants that are not included in the RAO, a significant share is made up of nuclear power plants, which account for 13% of the total electricity production in the Russian Federation.

Most of the problems of this most "advanced" from the point of view of what is commonly called liberal reforms, natural monopoly is generated by two reasons: first, the ill-conceived concept of the so-called Federal Wholesale Electricity and Capacity Market (FOREM), designed to introduce elements of competition both between producers , and between consumers of electricity; secondly, the fragmentation of the unified energy system in the process of corporatization of regional AO-energos, the transformation of the latter into local monopolists, which ultimately ended up in complete subordination of local authorities.

In fairness, it should be noted that the impetus for regionalization and fragmentation of the single electricity market was the introduction in 1991 of differentiated tariffs for electricity payments by consumers in certain regions, depending on the real costs of each energy system. This decision led to an irrational loading of energy capacities: large highly efficient stations remain chronically underloaded, while less efficient small stations belonging to regional energy systems are more fully loaded.

Tensions also remain between RAO "UES of Russia" and independent power plants that are trying to enter the wholesale market with their often cheaper electricity. In the conditions of "competition" the owner of the grids - RAO "UES of Russia" - is interested not only in the sale, first of all, of "their own", often more expensive electricity, but also in making a profit from the resale of "foreign" electricity purchased at a low price. Producers of cheap energy are deprived of the opportunity to sell it directly to solvent consumers, bypassing regional and federal intermediaries.

The main problem of the Russian electric power industry is non-payments. Due to the specifics of the products produced, the application of sanctions against non-payers is extremely difficult. The situation caused by non-payments can be significantly improved by realizing the significant export potential of RW. Currently, about 1/3 of the installed capacity of power plants (200 billion kWh) turned out to be redundant due to a sharp decline in production. According to some estimates, the export of electricity produced at excess capacity would make it possible to receive up to 16 billion dollars annually. However, in order to transmit large volumes of electricity over long distances with the preservation of its parameters, modernization of power lines and auxiliary facilities is required. So far, only about 10 billion kWh of electricity has been exported to non-CIS countries.

In our opinion, it is necessary to make fuller use of the advantages of a single centralized energy system as a more sustainable form of organization of the energy sector. The organization of the production of electric energy, in which generating capacities, transmission and distribution networks are concentrated in one hand, provides more opportunities for expansion to foreign markets. It is no coincidence that such a scheme is successfully operating in France, one of the world's largest electricity exporters.

The main goal of reforming the energy system - reducing costs - is fundamentally unattainable without a well-thought-out investment policy aimed at technical re-equipment of the industry. The half-measures proposed by RAO "UES of Russia" (organization of separate accounting for energy systems, streamlining the payment of bills by the population, elimination of intermediaries, transfer of social and cultural facilities to the balance of local authorities, reorganization of the work of energy sales organizations) are useful in themselves, but insufficient.

2. Gas industry. RAO "Gazprom" was established in February 1993 by reorganizing the State Gas Concern, in 1999 it was reorganized into OAO "Gazprom" in accordance with the requirements of the legislation on joint-stock companies. It accounts for about 25% of all federal budget revenues. Gazprom is the largest creditor of the Russian economy. According to Gazprom's reports, its monthly foreign exchange earnings amount to $600 million, 800 million rubles. receives from domestic consumers Mezhregiongaz. JSC "Gazprom" owns about 30% of the European gas market (21% of supplies to Western and 56% to Eastern Europe). Abroad, he has huge assets, mainly in the form of shares in companies that own gas transmission and gas distribution systems. "Gazprom" includes 8 gas production associations and 13 regional gas transportation enterprises, as well as the foreign economic enterprise "Gazexport"; they carry out about 95% of production and 100% of gas transportation.

Among the factors determining the stability of Gazprom's positions in the world market are the uniqueness of the resource base and the presence of a developed system of gas pipelines. In creating a unified gas supply system, Russia has outstripped the countries of Western Europe, where such a system is just beginning to take shape. For example, in Germany, Gazprom has a powerful system of gas pipelines that allows it to go directly to the consumer and thereby significantly increase revenue from gas sales. Gazprom has created a number of alliances with major Western corporations, which have made it possible to combine the technological, financial, scientific and technical potential of the companies. Thus, the merger with the Wintershall group (a subsidiary of the BASF concern) gives Gazprom the opportunity to control up to 10% of the German market with the prospect of increasing this share.

The economic and financial successes of Gazprom are largely due, firstly, to the beginning of the reform of the gas industry in 1989, which gave the concern two additional years to adapt to new business conditions. Secondly, by the beginning of the reforms, Gazprom had experience in foreign markets. He managed to successfully implement his "Gazprom" model of economic reforms. Both large and less significant enterprises that are part of the Gazprom system, in fact, remain its production units. As legal entities, they do not own either their assets, including subsoil use rights, or their income. Their statutory status is "OJSC enterprise". From a legal point of view, these are unitary enterprises established by OJSC and based on the right of operational management.

Gazprom's rigid vertical organizational structure allows it to develop and implement a long-term development program. Along with active external expansion, it provides for large investments in the domestic manufacturing industry, according to some estimates, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. The strategy of competition in foreign markets requires independence from the supply of equipment by import.

The development model chosen by Gazprom determines the nature and direction of the corporation's interaction with the state. Only as a large company - a natural monopoly - is Gazprom capable of becoming a powerful "locomotive" of the Russian economy in the foreseeable future. The demonopolization of Gazprom would mean the creation of favorable conditions for external competitors with the most negative consequences not only for him, but for the country as a whole.

The inexpediency of Gazprom's restructuring, in particular, the separation of Gazexport from its composition, is confirmed by domestic experience. So, in the Soviet period, when production, transportation and export operations were organizationally separated. The Soviet Union acted as a "supplier to the border." As soon as Gazprom became a vertically integrated structure, its positions in the fight against foreign competitors were sharply strengthened.

3. Rail transport. The share of railways in the total freight turnover of all types of public transport in the country is about 80%. The share of rail transport in passenger traffic reaches 41%, which is comparable in volume to road transport. The most important feature of the industry is that its main product - transportation - is created, as a rule, by several enterprises - railways, that is, at the level of the entire industry. Hence the need for a centralized formation and distribution of income from transportation, the accumulation of financial resources for the development of the railway network, the acquisition and repair of railway stock, and the introduction of scientific and technological progress.

Comparison of performance indicators of Russian railways, estimated by the number of ton-kilometers per one employed in transportation, with foreign data indicates that in Russia it is 2.5-3 times higher than in England, France, Germany and China . At the same time, the turnaround time for wagons in our country is 2-3 times less than in the USA, despite the long transportation distances. In Western Europe, railways are unprofitable: losses reach 50% and are compensated by state subsidies. In Russia, railways as a whole operate at a profit (despite the fact that the average railway tariff in Russia is 8-10 times lower than in Western countries). Losses of passenger transport are covered by the work of freight transport.

There are three concepts for reforming the MPS. In descending order of their radicalness, these are: the concept proposed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the concept of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation; concept developed by the IPU itself, the so-called "government". The essence of the latter lies in the fact that the transportation sector is singled out from the railway transport as a whole. It is defined as competitive and open to everyone who wants to start a business here. It is planned to develop competition in this sector through the acquisition by industrial enterprises - users of railway network services - of their own rolling stock, the creation of freight and passenger companies. All this should lead to a competitive reduction in transport costs. The implementation of this concept includes three stages. The first stage - until 2000 - provides for the creation of unitary freight and passenger companies in the system of the Ministry of Railways. At the same stage, part of the factories, construction enterprises, agriculture, housing and communal services should be withdrawn from the MPS system. The second stage - until 2005 - is the establishment of the work of passenger and cargo companies. The third stage - after 2005 - corporatization of passenger and freight companies, the redistribution of state and economic functions of the Ministry of Railways, the creation of a central railway company. However, the effectiveness of the proposed reform will not be high, if only because the share of costs for the wagon fleet in the cost of transportation accounts for no more than 18-20%. Moreover, the quality of services of new operators will not depend much on their efforts, since over 80% of the costs are associated with the work of centralized services: track maintenance, electrification, traction, etc. In addition, the proposed concept is contrary to existing legislation. The law "On federal railway transport" says: "Railway transport is a single production and technological complex." The concept is ultimately aimed at its fragmentation. Where urgent reform is really needed is in the forwarding business, which is an exceptionally lucrative form of customer service around the world. More than two thousand forwarding companies operate in the transport services market. Their activity is characterized by a one-sided orientation - they carry out only the sale and resale of freight, that is, railway tariffs for transportation. This devalues ​​the very concept of "transport expedition", the purpose of which, as you know, is to attract additional traffic, provide additional transport services and speed up the delivery of goods with the release of shippers and consignees from a large number of operations. Today, the receipt of forwarding services is actually replaced by the use of the right to a discount provided by the Ministry of Railways to a particular freight forwarder or consignor. As a result, discount volumes are growing, while traffic volumes are falling.

2.4. Tariff regulation of natural monopolies and impact on efficiency

Earlier in the work, such issues as the concept of monopoly and natural monopoly were considered (since this type of monopoly is mainly common in Russia), the influence of monopolies on the efficiency of the economy, now I would like to highlight in the statistical part such a problem as the regulation of monopolies and their presence in Russian economy. Monopolies are fraught with losses for society. Therefore, the state assumes the function of regulating monopolies, especially the natural one.

No, even the most perfect, price regulation will succeed without the restoration of state influence in the subjects of natural monopolies belonging to it (RAO "UES of Russia", the Ministry of Railways and RAO "Gazprom"). It’s not the case when the president describes the trust agreement for managing the state’s share in Gazprom as nothing less than “robbing the country”, and since the formation of RAO “UES of Russia”, not a single discussion of this problem has been held jointly with the government, while it "overgrown" with hundreds of intermediary firms directing financial flows bypassing not only the budget, but also the company itself.

In accordance with Presidential Decree No. 221 of February 28, 1995 "On Measures to Streamline State Regulation of Prices (Tariffs)", colleges of state representatives in natural monopolies were created to restore order, which should contribute to the growth of the market value of the shares of these companies, control the timeliness of entering into the state budget all due payments, monitor compliance with antimonopoly laws and create elements of a competitive environment. The presidential decree is of a conceptual nature and does not contain a specific reorganization plan, although the allocation of structural divisions within natural monopolists is spelled out quite clearly.

Natural monopolists are not forgotten in the public sector either. Thus, putting things in order in local natural monopolies (utilities) involves the introduction of energy-saving technologies, starting with the installation of meters and water meters in the apartments of Russian citizens, which, according to B. Nemtsov, can provide up to 30% cost savings.

More questions arise with the price regulation of natural monopolies. The price space in Russia currently includes two areas. The first is the sphere of free market prices, which are set by economic entities themselves on the basis of a balance of supply and demand. Moreover, prices for the products of enterprises that occupy a dominant position in the market, but do not belong to natural monopolies, are also formed freely and are included in this area, although they are controlled by the antimonopoly authorities of Russia. The second is the sphere of direct state regulation of prices and tariffs for products of natural monopolies and so-called socially significant goods.

Periodically conducted by the SAC of the Russian Federation, inspections of the practice of setting tariffs from year to year show the same thing: systematic violations of the procedure for setting tariffs, indicating the imperfection of the regulatory documents on pricing themselves. These documents make it possible to increase the number of industrial and production personnel while reducing production volumes, and to provide numerous benefits.

They are developed only in the interests of producers and do not take into account the economic interests and capabilities of consumers. Such tariffs provide: receiving unreasonably high wages in comparison with other industries and regions; payment of dividends regardless of how the enterprise worked; insurance of its employees; Misappropriation of part of the funds intended for the construction of housing and social facilities.

For example, in railway transport it is widely practiced: collection of additional payment for unfulfilled (underperformed) work (services) for the escort of wagons and cargo by paramilitary guards of the MP from Russia; overpricing in suburban passenger traffic; imposing on counterparties when concluding contracts for the carriage of goods conditions that are not related to the subject of the contract; allocation of food and industrial goods, various materials to the railway; requirement to pay in excess of tariffs for the shipment of export cargo, etc.

Numerous violations of the current pricing procedure and the imperfection of the latter were shown by checks in other branches of natural monopolies.

The idea is that the very mechanism for regulating prices for products and tariffs for the services of natural monopolies should be as open, understandable and "transparent", that is, each buyer has the right to know what and how much he pays for. At the same time, he must be sure that the appointed price or tariff is reasonable and fair. All of the above applies equally to freight and passenger tariffs for railway transport services, for electricity transmission and for gas transportation.

The Law "On Natural Monopolies" stipulates that among the methods of regulating the activities of subjects of natural monopolies, state bodies may apply price regulation through the determination of prices (tariffs) or their maximum level. Recall that in accordance with the government decree, in addition to using the marginal price change coefficients that we propose to apply taking into account inflation indices, price regulation can be carried out in other ways, for example, by setting fixed prices, marginal prices, surcharges, marginal profitability, declaring price increases.

The use of fixed prices, marginal prices or surcharges for effective price regulation in an inflationary transitional economy is obviously inappropriate due to the fact that their values ​​will have to be constantly reviewed. It is desirable that the regulation of prices over a significant time period, at least within a year, occurs automatically.

Recently, in particular, in the Concept of the Price Policy of the Russian Federation for 1996-1997, developed by the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Federation, it was proposed as a method of regulation "to take into account, when setting prices, a reasonable rate of return on the employed capital, providing dividends on equity capital." However, a professional revaluation of fixed capital requires a lot of time, that is, the procedure for approving and revising regulated prices and tariffs will take years. This is evidenced by the experience of regulation in the United States. In addition, the world practice has not yet resolved the question at what cost - initial or replacement - should the assessment of capital investments be made.

Another major problem is also complicated - the establishment of a "reasonable" or "fair" rate of return, because our specialists in price regulation, due to the underdevelopment of official statistics, have no idea even about the size of the average rate of return in Russia. Finally, the regulation of prices and tariffs for the products of natural monopoly entities through the establishment of a fixed rate of return on the invested capital of a corporation will serve as a stimulus for the search for illegal ways to obtain a "fair" profit, as was the case with the application of the rate of return in 1996-2000. Only then did the monopolist wind up current costs, and now investments will also be maximized.

Thus, from the methods of price regulation proposed by the government decree, the method of price change coefficients remains, which was actively used (unsuccessfully) during the years of reforms and, most likely, will be used in the future. On the one hand, it's natural. On the other hand, it is urgent to eliminate the accumulated shortcomings and errors on the basis of domestic and foreign regulatory experience. Unfortunately, for a long time to come, the Russian economy, despite successes in the field of financial stabilization, will be characterized by inflation, if we approach the matter by Western standards. And in developed countries, an economy with annual price growth exceeding 3-5% per year is considered inflationary. Therefore, we all the more need special instruments of the government's price policy in relation to natural monopolies. Obviously, in the conditions of the transitional inflationary economy of Russia, the regulation of prices for their products should be carried out by indexing, for example, using the consumer price index (or the industrial wholesale price index). Such recommendations are based on modern foreign experience.

In particular, in the UK, since 1985, the regulator initially determines the so-called "fair" price, based on the reasonable costs of the enterprise and normal profit. He is then allowed to increase his prices according to the formula CPI - X. The first component here is the consumer price index, the second is the cost saving target. All values ​​are taken as a percentage. If, for example, the estimated cost savings are planned at 2% per year, and annual inflation is assumed to be U/o then an enterprise-subject of a natural monopoly can increase its prices by only 3% on an annualized basis. When an enterprise objectively needs investments, the planned value of cost savings may be negative.

Table 2.1

UK telephone price regulation

Based on this experience, it is quite appropriate to talk about the need to adjust the level of prices for products of natural monopolies in accordance with the general level of inflation (consumer price index). However, if the main share of the cost of a monopoly enterprise is the price of raw materials, it is possible to use indicators of price increases in the raw material industry. Of course, there are more complex dependencies.

So, if the regulatory body, after appropriate monitoring of prices for the products of a natural monopolist, came to the conclusion that its prices should be closely correlated with inflation in the country (region) or price growth in any raw material industry or (as in the case of RAO Gazprom ) industry as a whole, then current prices can be adjusted according to the formula:

where: Pi - base price in the previous (i-th) period (month, quarter, year). The desired price can be determined based not on the calculated base price, but on the actual price of products that have already "taken root" in the market, that is, recognized by the seller and buyer; Jp - predicted (regional or federal) price index for the industry chosen by the regulatory agency or for the industry as a whole; k- correlation coefficient of the consumer price index and the selected price index for natural monopoly products, calculated by regulatory authorities based on the results of price monitoring. In theory, it should take into account the possible planned value of cost savings or another criterion for improving efficiency, or, on the contrary, the need for urgent investments (in fact, k = 1-X).

The calculation can also be made by adjusting for specific production conditions, that is, by multiplying the base price by the cost index for individual (or all) cost items that occupy the largest share in its structure:

where: Р R - regulated price; Р F - basic estimated or actual ("accustomed") price; Js i , - the growth rate of costs for the t-th article of the calculation of the cost of the tested products, in%; Ys i - share of the i-th article of the calculation in the cost of the tested products, in%. If costs for all costing items are taken into account, then SYs i = 100%.

From May 1994 to September 1995, the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Federation tried to practically implement this, or rather, a similar idea, by developing together with the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation "The procedure for indexing tariffs for the transportation of goods and fees for loading and unloading operations performed by railway transport of the Russian Federation. The nomenclature of material and technical resources consumed by rail transport was agreed upon and approved, with a change in the prices of which the indexation of tariffs for the transportation of goods and for loading and unloading operations is carried out. It included eleven positions: diesel fuel; diesel lubricating oil; fuel oil; coal; electricity; lumber; railway rails; railway sleepers; crushed stone; reinforced concrete structures; sheet steel of ordinary grades (up to 4 mm).

However, the price index based on this nomenclature was compiled not taking into account the specific weights of the types of products included in it, but in such a way as to ensure the desired growth rate of railway tariffs for MGTS (the profitability of transportation reached 26%). Although such a distortion cannot discredit the method itself.

They tried to eliminate the "monopolistic overlap" with the level of railway tariffs by "freezing" them in October-December 1995. Another extreme arose - in December the industry suffered losses in the amount of 134 billion rubles. For the first six months of 1996, the indexation of railway tariffs was carried out in an amount not exceeding the increase in industrial wholesale prices, that is, in fact, according to formula (1) with a coefficient k = 0.8 (or X = 20%). Losses from transportation amounted to 1.838 trillion. rub. It couldn't be otherwise. Even assuming that the tariff, which had "lost weight" under the conditions of the inflationary "freeze" by the beginning of 1996, had become "reasonable and fair", which is still a big question, where did the 20% increase in the efficiency of rail transportation, incorporated in tariff change algorithm?

From the second half of 1996 to June 1997, the revision of tariffs was carried out in parallel with the change in the wholesale price index for industry (a scheme tested and proven in Gazprom). And if in 1996 rail transportation by inertia was still unprofitable (156 billion rubles), then in 1997 they already became profitable. And so, on July 1, 1997, a decision was made to reduce the tariffs for rail transportation, as well as to reduce the prices for gas and electricity for industrial consumers. What is it - a calculated tariff policy or a political conjuncture?

The conclusion from the analysis is obvious: in the transitional economy of Russia, the most appropriate method for regulating prices and tariffs for products of natural monopolies is the indexing method, and the formula for tariffs for products of natural monopolies should look like this:

Of course, the value of "X" is not a criterion for increasing efficiency, but only an indicator of urgent investments (in the conditions of the Russian permanent budget crisis, one cannot seriously count on state support). By the way, the problem of the investment component of the tariff will also be solved at the same time.

True, a number of questions also arise here. First, it is necessary to determine as accurately as possible the base price to be indexed, and after the appropriate period, to revise it. The base or "fair" price after these calculations can be specified and in the end be the result of negotiations, agreement or, more simply, bargaining between the seller and the buyer. However, if this calculated and agreed "reasonable" tariff is lower than the tariff established by that time in practice, then it is unrealistic to raise the question of its reduction. However, the answer to this question has already been found by economic practice. Tariffs in this case should be "frozen".

In addition to the above, in some cases and industries, alternative methods of price regulation can be used. British experts recommend using the cost comparison method. In the presence of markets that are similar in general terms in terms of territory, equipment equipment from manufacturers and consumer requests, the regulatory body has the right to order an economic entity that is a natural monopolist to change the level and structure of its prices (tariffs) in accordance with a similar enterprise in this industry, but conducting a reasonable tariff policy. This method of regulation in our country can be quite widespread.

Of interest is the approach to this problem used in Poland. According to him, if it is not possible to eliminate obstacles to competition in the market quickly enough, then state regulation measures should be applied. For example, when telephone rates rose sharply, the Antimonopoly Office prohibited further increases to the point of changing the overall cost structure in line with European standards. This experience is very useful to take into account for the Russian energy commissions that regulate electricity tariffs.

American experts recommend that regulators control not the monopolist's costs and revenues themselves, but the satisfaction of needs in the regulated market. The essence of this approach is as follows: if a shortage develops and queues arise, if the buyer wants, but cannot purchase goods at a regulated price, then the latter must be increased. Scarcity is considered a greater evil than high prices.

2.5. Prospects for the restructuring of natural monopolies and the impact on the efficiency of the economy

The restructuring of natural monopolies is very promising for Russia. The price arbitrariness of natural monopolists here leads to increased regionalization of the national and localization of local markets. This is aggravated by the underdevelopment of the market infrastructure, the absence or weakness of information systems. But the main thing is that state regulation of the activities of natural monopolies is, in principle, imperfect and inefficient.

It should be noted that regulators in almost all countries do not have enough time, qualified personnel, or information. In most cases, checks of financial statements and accounting documents of natural monopoly entities are random, superficial and extended over time. The control bodies build their conclusions mainly on the basis of data provided by the audited enterprises themselves. The effectiveness of such regulation is not high and often, by limiting competition, does more harm than good.

Due to bureaucratic red tape, a sufficiently long period of time passes between the time a regulatory decision is made and the moment it is implemented, which becomes a brake on the development of these industries. Thus, in Russia, the deadlines for the implementation of the resolutions of the government of the Russian Federation on the regulation of prices for products of natural monopolies were almost always unrealizable. And the process of regulation itself generates additional costs on the part of both enterprises that fall under it and the state.

Consequently, from the point of view of a long-term strategy, more effective measures are needed to force monopolists into civilizational behavior than administrative regulation of prices and tariffs. An alternative way to influence natural monopolists is to deregulate and stimulate competition.

It should be noted that the presidential decree provides not only short- and medium-term measures to carry out structural reform of natural monopolies, but also long-term measures, in particular, the restructuring of RAO "UES of Russia". It is planned to significantly expand the federal wholesale electricity and capacity market (FOREM) by increasing the number of electricity generating enterprises from 30 to 51, which should launch competitive mechanisms and help reduce energy tariffs. However, all this is not new. Much less explored is the question of what should (and should?) be done to restructure the Ministry of Railways and RAO "Gazprom".

It is known from foreign experience that a subject of a natural monopoly may face competition from enterprises that use a fundamentally different technique or technology in the production of the same or similar products. For example, modern innovations have opened up for many enterprises the possibility of independent construction of fairly large power generators. Naturally, in this case, it becomes inexpedient to regulate tariffs for electricity and its transmission.

An identical situation may arise during the transportation of oil and gas, rail transportation. Therefore, when deciding on the abolition of tariff regulation, it is very important that both suppliers and their customers have real access to alternative and competitive sources of supply or demand. In our opinion, Russian subjects of natural monopoly should be given the right to apply to the government of the Russian Federation with proposals to abolish the regulation of prices and tariffs for their products in all cases of serious competition.

State-encouraged competition within railway transport enterprises, the division of ownership or management of the operation of railway tracks and trains should become powerful factors in restraining the growth of railway tariffs. The main objective brake on competition in railway transport is the contradiction between the owner of railway facilities, who would like to charge the maximum fee for the use of tracks, and the user of these facilities, who is interested in minimizing their costs. Characteristic for Russia at the moment is that the owner of both the railway tracks and the wagons is the state represented by MP S.

The distinction between ownership and operation of railroad tracks and trains can be experimentally carried out on one of the country's railways. Separation of enterprises-users of railway cars from the owner of the tracks, which will be the state for a long time, it is advisable to start with the division of accounts, followed by organizational separation. In case of obvious success of this project, it can be completed with the privatization of at least the enterprises that operate the rolling stock.

Administrative and legal forms of such a division of economic entities at various stages is the subject of legal research and development. The task of economists is to solve the problem in such a way that the owner of the track does not set too high fees "for access" to the infrastructure, and enterprises operating railway cars really enter into competition for the consumer of transportation services.

Separation from the general "bundle" of capacities of those enterprises that provide products and services to end consumers is currently taking place in other sectors of natural monopolies. For example, in the USA and Europe - in oil and gas pipeline transport, telecommunications and electric power industry. The Russian government, in our opinion, should also not lag behind events, but play ahead of the curve by trying to introduce the latest Western developments into domestic economic practice. However, in all these cases, carefully thought-out price control measures are necessary, which can be freely set by its owner. It is important that the separation of infrastructure (its products and services) from the very provision of such services does not lead to new manifestations of monopoly and inefficiency.

As for the restructuring of RAO "Gazprom", here it is necessary to measure it seven times and, perhaps, not cut it at all. First, the monopolized gas industry introduces new capacity at a cost that exceeds annual public investment. Secondly, Gazprom (the only Russian natural monopoly) is not a subject of the national, but of the world market, where fierce competition reigns, and its demonopolization is a gift to foreign capital. Finally, thirdly, according to Russian antimonopoly legislation, in exceptional cases, the actions of an economic entity can be recognized as lawful if it proves that the positive effect from them, including in the socio-economic sphere, will exceed the negative consequences for the commodity market in question.

2.6. Presence of natural monopolies in the Russian market. Their share, impact on the national economy

2.6.1. Regulation of activities of natural monopolies

The high economic efficiency of natural monopolies makes it absolutely unacceptable to break them up. However, this does not mean that the state can refrain from regulating natural monopolies. After all, their uncontrolled activities can bring significant harm.

As monopolists, these structures are trying to solve their problems primarily by raising tariffs and prices. The consequences of this for the country's economy are the most devastating. Production costs in other industries are rising, non-payments are growing, and interregional ties are paralyzed. And this is not an abstract theory. The entire Russian business press of recent years is full of industrial complaints about inflated railroad rates, skyrocketing energy prices, and so on.

At the same time, the natural nature of the monopoly position, although it creates opportunities for effective work, by no means guarantees that these opportunities will be realized in practice. After all, there is a mechanism of x-inefficiency. Indeed, in theory, RAO UES of Russia could have lower costs than several competing electric power firms. But where is the guarantee that it wants keep them at a minimum level, and, say, will not inflate the costs of the top management of the company. In the real history of RAO "UES of Russia", there was, in particular, a case when the payment for a flight to the United States by a special plane of the mother-in-law and the dog of the company's general director was attributed to the costs of the company.

The main way to deal with the negative aspects of natural monopolies is in state control over the pricing of natural monopoly goods and/or their volume of production (say, by determining the range of consumers subject to mandatory service).

2.6.2. Production level maximization

Price regulation of the activities of natural monopolies involves the forced fixing of the maximum value of prices for the monopolist's products. At the same time, the consequences of this regulatory measure directly depend on the specific level at which prices will be fixed.

Rice. 2.1. Price regulation of natural monopoly products in order to maximize production

On fig. 2.1 shows a common variant of regulation, in which the highest allowable price is fixed at the level of intersection of marginal costs with the demand curve (P = MS = D). The main consequence of setting a maximum price in terms of the behavior of the monopoly firm is a change in the marginal revenue curve. As soon as the monopolist cannot raise the price above the named level, even at those volumes of production where the demand curve objectively allows it, its marginal revenue curve shifts from the MR position to the position MR 1 (highlighted in the graph by a thick line), coinciding with the maximum allowable price value. R. Indeed, if the maximum price of electricity is fixed at 21 kopecks. per 1 kWh, then each additional kilowatt sold will generate income equal to this amount, and the marginal revenue curve will degenerate into a horizontal straight line passing at this level.

Then the rule MC = MR comes into force. Like any other firm, the monopolist himself without any government coercion(which is a major plus of this method of regulation!) will strive to bring the volume of production to Q M , corresponding to the point of intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves. On fig. 2.1, other advantages of this method of limiting monopolistic prices are also clearly visible: a significant increase in production is achieved (Qreg > Q M) and prices go down (Рreg< Рм).

But the described method of regulation also has a drawback: the price level set by the state is in no way connected with average costs, i.e. he can, by the will of the state, secure both the receipt of economic profits (Fig. 2.1a) and the incurring of losses (Fig. 2.1b). Both options are undesirable. The presence of a natural monopolist of constant economic profits is tantamount to a tax on consumers. By paying inflated prices, they increase their costs with all the ensuing negative consequences (reducing demand for their products, reducing competitiveness, etc.). But even more dangerous, perhaps, is fixing losses. In the long term, a natural monopolist can cover them only through government subsidies, otherwise it will simply go bankrupt. And this opens a wide road to extravagance. As soon as there is no hope for profit anyway, and the state will cover the losses anyway, the monopolist can only benefit by squandering public funds. The highest salaries for managers, bloated staffs, huge hospitality expenses - all these are hidden forms of enrichment at the expense of the treasury. In other words, x-inefficiency in this case reaches the highest level.

2.7. Ensuring self-sufficiency

Another guideline for setting maximum prices may be the point of intersection of the average cost curve and the demand line (P = ATC = D). Since the average cost in this case is exactly equal to the selling price, the natural monopolist works in this case without losses and profits. Thus, the main problem of the previous control method is removed.

On fig. Table 2.2 shows that this approach to regulation also solves the problem of increasing production (Qreg > Q M) and lowering prices (Рreg< Р M).

However, the MC = MR rule is against regulators this time around. Up to the point of intersection of the marginal cost curve and the new marginal revenue curve MR due to government price fixing, an increase in production is beneficial to the monopolist. But after this point (N), each extra good produced will cause more costs than it generates revenues (MC > MR). It is obvious that the monopolist by hook or by crook will strive to stop production at the level of Q N and not bring it to Qreg. Since the demand at the price P will be exactly Qreg, then there will be a shortage in the market (Qreg > Q N).

Rice. 2.2. Regulation of prices for products of a natural monopoly in order to ensure break-even production

Citizens of large Russian cities experienced something similar in the early 1990s. The Ministry of Railways stopped repairing electric trains, and there were fewer and fewer of them on the line every day. Of course, there were “objective” reasons for this: it was the vandalism of teenagers who broke seats and smashed windows, and the lack of funds for repairs. But all of them, as if by magic, disappeared (or at least stopped affecting the number of plying electric trains) as soon as ticket prices were raised.

Thus, the second approach to price regulation is also not ideal. In its pure form, it causes commodity shortages and therefore requires additional coercive measures against the monopolists. The most common of these measures in modern Russia is the compilation of lists of consumers whose supply the monopolist has no right to stop supplying.

2.8. Reforming the structure of Russian natural monopolies

In addition to price regulation, reforming the structure of natural monopolies can also bring certain benefits - especially in our country. The fact is that in Russia, within the framework of a single corporation, both the production of natural monopoly goods and the production of goods that are more efficient to produce under competitive conditions are often combined. This association is, as a rule, the nature of vertical integration. As a result, a giant monopoly is formed, representing a whole sphere of the national economy.

RAO "Gazprom", RAO "UES of Russia", the Ministry of Railways - these are the three whales of "monopoly in Russian", the clearest examples of such associations. RAO Gazprom, along with the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia (i.e., a natural monopoly element), includes exploration, production, instrument-making enterprises, design and technological structures, social facilities (i.e., potentially competitive elements). The Ministry of Railways is in charge of both infrastructure - railways, stations, information system - and non-monopoly activities - contracting construction and repair organizations, catering enterprises. Entire towns and cities are on the balance sheet of the ministry. RAO "UES of Russia" unites both power grids and power plants.

The essence of the reforms intensively discussed in our country is as follows: it is proposed to develop competition in those types of activities of natural monopolies where it can be achieved. So, the competition of different companies for the reception of sewage from each apartment in a multi-storey building is sheer nonsense. But the competition of firms that provide preventive maintenance and repair of water supply and sewer systems in an apartment is probably the only way to protect the consumer from the arbitrariness of modern DEZ, REU, etc. Only if there is competition, residents will not have to wait weeks for a called master plumber.

It is obvious, however, that the separation of the natural monopoly and potentially competitive sectors should not be forced and mechanistic. After all, not only competition, but also industrial integration has its potential to reduce costs. Will the efficiency of the energy industry, for example, increase if, instead of the current RAO "UES of Russia", a national company managing power transmission lines and many corporations owning power plants are created? After all, even in countries with very strict rules of antimonopoly regulation - Japan, the USA, Germany - the main scheme for organizing the energy sector is energy systems, i.e. concentration of generating capacities and transmission networks in one hand.

All the more careful study requires the idea of ​​disaggregating the energy industry by creating independent regional energy systems. The level of competition in the industry is unlikely to increase, but the isolation of the regions will increase. In addition, the unified energy system of the country provides savings, as it allows to cover the daily consumption peak in the eastern part of Russia using the capacities of the western regions that are “sleeping” during these hours and vice versa (the benefits of horizontal integration). Will it be possible to achieve such coherence in the work of independent regional energy systems?

When reforming Russian monopolies, one should keep in mind their positions in international competition. For example, RAO Gazprom is the largest international corporation. Its restructuring could undermine Russia's position in the global gas market. In general, it is obvious that the reforms of structures, including the natural monopoly sphere, should be carried out in stages, with great care and analysis of each stage of transformation.

2.9. National or private?

Finally, another difficult issue regarding natural monopolies relates to their status: should these companies be public or private? The origins of this problem are connected with the fact that natural monopolies, as we have seen, are a very specific subject of the economy, which never functions according to purely market principles. If natural monopolies preclude competition; if the consumer is absolutely deprived of choice; if prices and production volumes are determined not by the play of market forces, but either by the arbitrariness of the monopolist, or by decisions of the state; if many other mechanisms of market functioning are violated. If all this is true, then isn't it better to manage natural monopolies not as private, but as state-owned enterprises?

Economics has not developed a clear answer to this question. In many developed market states, natural monopolies are nationally owned, but not less so in countries where they are private.

The usual arguments in favor of nationalization are related to the fact that it is easier to carry out government policy in relation to prices, tariffs, production volumes, etc. in a state-owned enterprise. (Recall that the regulation of these parameters is inevitable in any case - both with private and state ownership). In addition, state ownership excludes monopolistic abuses in order to enrich the owners. Simply put, where a private monopolist will squeeze every penny out of consumers for its profits, the state monopolist is likely to take a moderate position. After all, profit is by no means its main goal. If the natural monopolist is unprofitable, then it is not at all clear what can keep private capital in such an enterprise.

Arguments against nationalization are related to the fear of lowering the efficiency of the natural monopolist. Having no need to focus primarily and above all on commercial success, the director of such a firm turns into a government official. And he readily fulfills any, the most ridiculous instructions, as long as they correspond to the wishes of his superiors. Dependent sentiments are also rising at the state enterprise: there is nothing to be afraid of losses, everything will be covered by the budget. Finally, the danger of corruption is growing: too large volumes of state, i.e. "Personal draws", the money passes through the cash desks of the monopolist. With the complex nature of the commercial activities of such firms, it can be difficult to keep track of this money.

Thus, there are serious arguments on both sides. In practice, the issue of ownership is most often resolved in the spirit of national traditions. Countries with a statist mentality prefer the nationalization of natural monopolies. In countries with strong individualistic traditions, on the contrary, they tend to private property.

CONCLUSION

Monopolies set the level of production below the effective level, charging a price above marginal cost, which leads to a deadweight loss for society. The effects of such a policy can be mitigated through prudent government action or, in some cases, by the monopolist itself through price discrimination. How common is the monopoly problem?

In a sense, monopoly is quite common. Most firms control the price they set to some degree. Nobody forces them to charge a market price for their products, because they differ significantly from the products of other firms. Mercedes is not samara, TV So pu - by no means Rubin. Each of these goods has a decreasing demand curve, which gives each producer a certain amount of power over the market.

Yet firms with truly monopoly power over the market are rare. Few of the products are truly unique. Most have substitutes that, if not completely identical to them, are very close. Company Nestle may raise the price of ice cream a little, but if its marketers overdo it, sales will plummet.

After all, monopoly power over the market is very relative. It is true that many firms have “some monopoly power. But it is equally true that their monopoly power is limited. We would not make the big mistake of thinking that the markets in which such firms operate are competitive, even if this is not entirely true.

Monopoly is the only supplier in the market. Monopolies arise when a firm manages to seize a source of a key resource, obtain exclusive rights from the government to supply a product, or satisfy a market demand at a lower cost than a few firms. Since the monopoly is the only supplier, the demand curve for its products is decreasing. When a monopoly increases production by one unit, this causes a decrease in the price of its product, which reduces the income from the sale of products. As a result, the marginal revenue of a monopoly is always less than the price of its commodity. Like a competitive firm, a monopoly firm maximizes profit by producing the output at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The monopoly then sets a price corresponding to the demand for that volume of output. Unlike a competitive firm, the monopoly price exceeds the firm's marginal revenue and hence its marginal cost. The output of the profit-maximizing monopolist lies below the level that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. That is, when the monopolist charges a price above marginal cost, some consumers who value the good above marginal cost but below the monopoly price set will refuse to buy it. As a result, the activity of the monopoly leads to irretrievable losses for society, similar to those that arise when a tax is introduced.

The government has responded to the monopoly problem in one of four ways: using antitrust laws to increase competition in the industry; regulates prices set by monopolies; transforms monopolies into state enterprises; in the event of a minor, compared with the inevitable imperfections of policy, market failure, policies can simply "go with the flow." One method of increasing monopoly profits is to charge different prices for the same product depending on the willingness of different groups of consumers to pay for it. The practice of price discrimination leads to an increase in economic welfare, since the goods will be purchased by those buyers who would otherwise refuse to buy it. In the special case of perfect price discrimination, there is no deadweight loss. In a more general case of imperfect price discrimination, it can lead to both an increase and a decrease in welfare in comparison with the establishment of a single monopoly price.

We can say that the monopolist's output is "too small" and the price of its products is "too high". This forces society to look for ways to regulate the monopoly, to achieve efficiency in the market. So, we have considered the essence and position of monopolies (especially natural ones) in the Russian market, their impact on the Russian economy, and the prospects for their reform. The modern approach to the regulation of natural monopolies, in our opinion, should be based on the position that natural monopolies are an integral part of what J. Galbraith called the "planning system". In today's highly developed economy, it includes the largest corporations. The laws of their behavior differ from the laws of functioning of the traditional market system, which plays a subordinate role in the modern economy. The market itself is not able to manage or control the "planning system". These functions can only be performed by the state and society as a whole. In the case of natural monopolies, such control should concern costs, prices, and distribution of profits. The economic activity of monopolies, including natural ones, should be considered in the context of the globalization of the world economy and the tightening of international competition for transnational corporations. It is transnational corporations that are the main subjects of the global economy, accumulating most of the income generated in it. The creation and successful development of these companies require huge efforts, time, a favorable climate, and support, including at the government level. The national economy without such companies is doomed to a passive role in global economic relations. Today in our country there is the only transnational company in the full sense of the word, which has undeniable weight on the European continent - this is OAO Gazprom.

LIST OF USED LITERATURE

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Market monopolization- a situation where one of the sellers or buyers accounts for such a large share of the total volume of sales or purchases in a particular commodity market that it can influence the formation of prices and terms of transactions to a greater extent than other participants in this market.

The market mechanism alone cannot prevent a particular firm from monopolizing the market for a particular product. At the same time, such a monopolization of the market may arise due to:

1) economic advantage;

2) various collusion or crowding out competitors.

The economic advantage of a particular firm in the market may arise due to the fact that it was able to offer the buyer the most favorable price-quality ratio for their goods. The basis of such an advantage is usually the introduction of the most advanced production technologies or methods for organizing the production and marketing of goods.

Even if the result of such activities of the company is the capture of an overwhelming market share, then there is nothing dangerous in this. After all, here the market mechanism successfully solves its main task - it ensures the best distribution of limited resources. Indeed, in such a situation, the largest share of resources goes to the firm that won the competition due to the best use of limited resources and the achievement of minimal costs on this basis.

There are no grounds for government intervention here. If such a firm tries to use its market dominance to drive up prices, then it will create the conditions for other firms, even those with higher costs, to survive by offering lower prices.

A completely different matter is the monopolization of the market, when situations of pure monopoly or oligopoly arise on it not due to the best technology or organization of production, but due to collusion of several largest firms among themselves, crowding out or absorbing other competitors. In this case, the firms that ensure the best use of limited resources do not necessarily become the owners of the market, and then these resources are distributed worse than they could be in a non-monopolized market.

The development of monopolies undermines the competitive beginning of a market economy, adversely affects the solution of macroeconomic problems, and leads to a decrease in the efficiency of social production.

It is in this situation that the state has to intervene in order to stop the monopolization of the market and restore normal competition, when market mechanisms can again work successfully.

Only the state with its possibilities of legislative and other anti-monopoly activities, the use of law enforcement agencies, if necessary, can limit monopolization.

The first experience of organized antitrust activity of the state was laid down by the adoption of antitrust legislation in the USA in 1890 (Sherman Law). Later, similar laws appeared in other countries. Antimonopoly legislation is aimed at maintaining such a structure of production that would allow it to remain competitive. Calculations showed that one company should not produce more than 40 percent of a particular type of product. Legislation prohibits any collusion to artificially maintain prices that do not correspond to the real relationship between supply and demand.

SECTION VI. MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICE

Given the functions of supply and demand, the specific level of the market price also depends on the totality of market characteristics that form the so-called market structure. This means that the structure (type) of the market where supply and demand meet is an important pricing factor. By combining various properties of the market, you can create a large number of market structures, but the most common of them in the market of goods are perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, oligopoly.

perfect competition market characterized by the presence of many buyers homogeneous good and many of its sellers, each of which accounts for a small part of the industry supply.

Note that the market is market for a homogeneous good , if the goods circulating on it are perceived by the consumer as absolutely (or completely) interchangeable goods. In that case, if the goods circulating on the market are perceived by the consumer as partially substitutable, then we have market for a heterogeneous good .

The market of perfect competition is also characterized by the fact that it is open and all participants in transactions have complete information about the course and results of trading. Obviously, in such conditions, the balance between supply and demand will be established at a single price for all.

The equilibrium of a perfectly competitive firm in the long run is characterized by the equality

P=AC=MC=LAC=LMC. (one)

From it it follows that:

The firm's output corresponds to the maximum possible profit, since MC = P;

For a given volume of output, the optimal combination of the factors of production used is provided, since MC = AC, AC = min;

The inflow of capital from other industries will stop in the industry, since P = AC, i.e. production does not generate economic profit.

The number of firms operating in a competitive industry in the long run depends on the nature of the change in returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale reduce the number of competitive firms, contributing to the monopolization of industry supply.

Monopoly market (monopoly)- this is a market of a homogeneous good, in which many buyers are opposed by one, and for other sellers the entrance to this market is closed. Market closure can act both as a directive ban on engaging in some type of economic activity (state monopoly on the production and sale of wine and vodka products), and in the form of the need to make large one-time investments in fixed capital, which, in the event of an exit from the industry, cannot be returned. (costs for the creation of specialized equipment).

In a special category are natural monopolies , the emergence of which contributes to the growth of returns to scale of production. A characteristic feature of a natural monopoly is a decrease in the average costs of a long period up to the complete saturation of industry demand.

Unlike a perfect competitor, a monopolist, being the only producer of a given product in the industry, sets the quantity of output itself, i.e. he determines the volume of supply of the good, as well as the price of the good, choosing a point on the industry demand curve. It means that there is no supply function in a monopoly market as the dependence of supply on price, and the price in a monopolized market is a function of quantity: P = f(Q).

A monopolist can focus economic activity both on maximizing profits and on achieving other goals. When choosing the volume of supply (volume of output), depending on the goals of the monopolist, he relies on data on the dynamics of marginal costs MC (which underlie the supply function of a perfect competitor).

In order to maximize profit, the monopolist must produce such a volume of output at which the marginal revenue (MR) is equal to the marginal cost (MC). So the equality MC=MR

is an monopoly's profit maximization condition, when marginal revenue is decreasing and marginal cost is constant or increasing.

Marginal revenue under a normal, decreasing market demand function is always less than the demand price. The deviation of MR from P depends on the price elasticity of demand. With a straight-line function of industry demand (D), the slope of the marginal revenue (MR) curve is twice as steep as the slope of direct demand.

The process of price setting by a profit-maximizing monopoly is illustrated in Figure 1.

The point of intersection of the lines MR and MC is called Cournot point, it defines the combination of P M and Q M , represented by the point M.

The area of ​​the rectangle P M M23 represents the profit of the monopoly.

The degree of excess of the monopoly price P M over the marginal cost MC K at the monopoly output Q M corresponding to the Cournot point characterizes market power monopolist and is measured using Lerner coefficient (L):

L = (P - MC) / P.

The market or monopoly power of the producer depends on the elasticity of industry demand with the volume of sales Q M .

Monopoly, striving for maximum profit, does not bring output to the optimal volume from the standpoint of society (Q E).

Rice. 1 Profit maximization by monopoly

Society's losses from the monopolization of production increase as it spreads along the vertical of the social division of labor.

A change in the purpose of the economic activity of a monopoly is accompanied by a change in the chosen price-quantity combination. In a monopolized market, the price decreases and the volume of sales increases as one moves from profit maximization to profit maximization and from profit maximization to revenue maximization.

The variety of monopoly prices for a given market demand increases significantly due to the ability of the monopoly to conduct price discrimination (sale of a homogeneous good to different buyers at different prices), which increases both the monopoly's supply by expanding the contingent of buyers, and its profit by reducing consumer surplus. At the same time, differences in prices are not related to the costs of production and delivery of goods to the market.

A necessary condition for the implementation of price discrimination is the impossibility of reselling the good. Therefore, it is most widely used in the service sector.

Terms, providing the opportunity setting different prices for the same good, distinguish the following types of price discrimination:

1) spatial (sale in the city and the countryside);

2) temporary (tickets for daytime and evening screenings);

3) by income of consumers (services of a doctor, a lawyer for the rich and the poor);

4) by the volume of consumption of the good (the maximum required amount and beyond);

5) according to the social status of the consumer (tickets for students and employees).

Depending on the implementation method distinguish three categories (degrees) of price discrimination.

Discrimination in the first degree is the sale of each unit of a good at its demand price.

second degree discriminationis the sale by a monopoly at different prices of different batches of products.

third degree discriminationis the sale of a good by a monopoly at different prices in different market segments. This is possible when the industry demand is divided by the demand of several groups of buyers (market segments) with different demand functions. Here the task of the monopolist is to set for each group of buyers such prices that maximize the total profit.

Carrying out price discrimination allows you to keep consumers with low purchasing power in the market.

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