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Nevel offensive operation. Nevel offensive operation September offensive of the Red Army in Belarus

September offensive of the Red Army in Belarus

After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German high command decided to go on the defensive on the Eastern Front, and the order was given to establish themselves in the places that they held. On August 11, Hitler signed an order for the temporary construction of the “Eastern Wall” - a strategic defensive line. The main part of this rampart was the defensive structures on the Dnieper.

The fundamental turning point in the war that began at Stalingrad was finally consolidated in the summer of 1943 during the Battle of Kursk, when the Germans lost their last hope of turning the tide of events in their favor. The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Kursk developed into a general strategic offensive from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. The Dnieper was crossed, and important bridgeheads were captured on its right bank.

At the beginning of September, the Kalinin Front, which at that time was commanded by A.I. Eremenko, continued active military operations. This military leader left behind memories that are called “Years of Retribution. 1943-1945".

The commander of the Kalinin Front recalled how the offensive developed in early September: “From September 1 to 8, the troops of the 39th and 43rd armies continued the offensive in some sectors, in others they consolidated on the achieved lines and, with special assault detachments, carried out active combat operations, mainly to defeat strong points enemy. Progress was achieved only in certain areas and was very slow.”

It should be noted that the slow advance was not due to weather conditions, which was constantly blamed by the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, I. Kh. Bagromyan. The Germans retreated in an organized manner, constantly counterattacking. A.I. Eremenko himself saw the reasons for the failures in the fact that the offensive “was running out of steam”, that there was a shortage of ammunition. He wrote: “Heavy fighting in early September did not bring the desired results. Therefore, on September 8, I again asked Headquarters to allow a break in offensive operations in order to bring up shells, carry out a small regrouping of troops and slightly change the direction of the main attack. In addition, the new commander had to be given at least a few days to get up to speed with the military affairs of the army in a calmer environment. The answer this time was positive.”

However, it is obvious that in this area they expected a more favorable development of events for Headquarters. It can be assumed that such delay and indecisiveness of A. I. Eremenko led to the fact that the 1st Baltic Front, formed from Kalinin, was given command to I. Kh. Bagromyan. A. I. Eremenko himself is silent about this question in his memoirs, but I. Kh. Bagromyan provides fragmentary information.

Subsequent actions, it seems, were well-planned measures aimed at misinforming the German command.

A. I. Eremenko recalls: “On the left flank of the army in the zone of the 5th Guards Corps, a false approach of troops (infantry, artillery and tanks) was carried out from the depths and their concentration. In the zone of the 83rd Rifle Corps, a false concentration of troops was also carried out, supposedly for an offensive. The construction of bridges across the river was demonstrated. Tsarevich in the Sushchevo region. In some areas, false smoke curtains were placed to create the impression of covering approaching troops in the zone of the 5th Guards, 83rd Rifle Corps and troops retreating from the front edge in the zone of the 2nd Guards and 84th Corps. In order to further confuse the enemy and divert his attention from the new direction of our main attack, it was decided to begin the offensive by the left flank of the 43rd Army a day earlier.”

These measures yielded results and the offensive, which began on September 13, began to develop successfully. On September 15, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies continued the offensive, destroying the encircled enemy units, and advanced up to 13 km, capturing up to 50 settlements... On September 19, they began the last stage of the Dukhovshchina-Demidov offensive operation... Subsequently, the 39th Army, turning to the west, without respite, she continued the attack on Vitebsk, while interacting with the 43rd Army of our front.

Thus, at the end of September, the military operations of the Kalinin Front made it possible to come close to the Belarusian lands.

Reflecting on what was the guarantor of the success of the offensive Dukhovshchina operation, A. I. Eremenko writes a lot about the party work carried out on the Kalinin Front. He notes: “The most important condition for the success of our actions was the widespread party-political work among the troops.” However, many of the data cited by the commander of the Kalinin Front can be considered a tribute to the times and Marxist-Leninist methodology.

On August 26, 1943, the Chernigov-Pripyat offensive operation of the troops of the Central Front under Army General K.K. Rokossovsky began. It was part of the battle for the Dnieper. The following armies took part in the operation: 13th (Colonel General M.P. Pukhov), 48th (Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko), 65th (Lieutenant General P.I. Batov), 60th I (Lieutenant General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 61st (Lieutenant General P.A. Berlov), 2nd Tank (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces A.R. Rogozin), 16th Air (General Aviation Lieutenant S.I. Rudenko). The front troops were opposed by the 2nd Army, part of the troops of the 9th Army of Army Group Center and the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South of the Wehrmacht.

The main blow was delivered in Novgorod-Seversky, with an additional blow in the Kanatopskoye direction. It was planned to reach the middle reaches of the Dnieper.

By September 23, the first settlement on the territory of Belarus, Komarin, was liberated. On September 27, units of the 65th Army liberated Terekhovka, and a number of bridgeheads on the banks of the Sozha and Pripyat rivers were also captured. On September 1, the Bryansk operation of the Bryansk Front began, during which troops of the 50th and 13th armies entered Belarus and liberated the territory up to the Pronya and Sozh rivers by October 3.

In the Chernigov-Pripyat operation, front commander K.K. Rokossovsky assigned the armored forces the following task: “The 2nd Tank Army, with the infantry of the 65th Army reaching the Novo-Yamskoye, Sosnitsa line, cross the river. North... overtake... overtake the infantry... and, developing an offensive in the direction of Orlya, Chernatskoye, successively capture the areas: on the first day of the army's offensive - Torlonovo, Fimanovo, Orlya; on the second day - Chernatskoye, Romashkovo, Seredina-Buda.

In the future, advance on Pigarevka, Kalievka with the task of capturing the crossings on the river. Desna in the Novgorod-Seversky region." The tankers successfully completed the task assigned to them.

During this operation, the extraordinary leadership talent of front commander K.K. Rokossovsky and his ability to make quick, flexible and non-standard decisions were revealed. Seeing that success accompanies the 60th Army of General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, the commander transfers the direction of the main attack to its sector. The 2nd Tank Army and other formations are transferred to Chernyakhovsky, which develop their success.

On September 21, the troops of the left wing of the front, after crossing the Desna, liberated Chernigov and reached the Dnieper. The next day, units of the 13th Army crossed the Dnieper on the move and began the liberation of the southern part of the Gomel region (formerly Polesie region).

On the morning of September 25, troops of the 65th Army captured the village of Gorodok (Dobrush district) - the first settlement located on the border of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Until mid-September 27, the 162nd Infantry Division of the 65th Army captured Tserehovka.

On the night of September 28, having overcome enemy resistance, the troops of the Bryansk Front entered the territory of the Vetkovsky district, and in the morning they reached the Sozh River.

On September 5, two armies of the Central Front - the 13th and 60th - were transferred to the Voronezh Front. Instead of them, three armies moved from the disbanded Bryansk Front (10.10.1943) to the Central Army - the 50th (Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin), the 3rd (Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov) and the 63rd (Lieutenant General U. Ya. Kalpakchi). The 11th Army of Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command.

Since the autumn of 1943, close combat cooperation between the partisans and the Red Army units was established directly on the territory of the republic. The partisans of the Gomel region, on instructions from the military command, cut off the enemy’s retreat from Gorval to Shatilki, defeated them and held Gorval from November 19, 1943 until the approach of Soviet troops. In these battles, the partisans destroyed more than 150 Nazis and captured 110 vehicles with military cargo. From the beginning of September to the end of November 1943, the partisans marched through the territory of the Minsk, Pinsk, Brest, Baranovichi and Bialystok regions, crossed five major railway lines, crossed the Yaselda, Shchara, Neman, Koturu, Oginsky Canal rivers, and repeatedly entered into battle. The partisan movement and underground struggle in the winter of 1943-1944 developed in a difficult situation caused by the intensification of the punitive actions of the occupiers. To fight the partisans and protect communications and other military installations on the territory of Belarus, the German command sent 9 security divisions and more than 100 security battalions, special police units, numerous units of Army Group Center and army rear services were involved.

Nevel, who occupied a key position in the Vitebsk direction, was of enormous operational importance for the warring parties. With the liberation of this city, the functioning of the Dno-Novosokolniki-Nevel road, which allowed the Nazis to maneuver forces between army groups “Center” and “North”, stopped. At the junction of these two groupings of Hitler’s troops, a 20 km gap was formed, unfilled by troops. Realizing the danger of the current situation, the German command took all measures to eliminate the breakthrough of Soviet troops, recapture Nevel, and restore the situation at the front. The opponents hastily transferred 2 infantry divisions from near Leningrad, 5 infantry and a tank division from the southern wing of Army Group Center to this area. All squadrons of the 6th Air Fleet were also concentrated here. From October 11 to October 31, the Nazis' counterattacks came one after another. As a result, the enemy managed to stop the movement of the Red Army troops, but failed to return Nevel. However, the troops of the Kalinin Front, having lost 56,474 people killed, wounded and missing in the October battles, did not complete their task. They were forced to conduct a new regrouping of forces and prepare to continue the operation in the Vitebsk direction.

Preparations for the operation began long before it began. Despite the fact that Headquarters did not officially give orders for development, the operation was developed before the troops entered conditional positions. A. I. Eremenko recalls: “With the end of the Dukhovshchina-Demidov operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front developed an offensive against Vitebsk. The Nevelsk operation came next, which we had also planned in advance. No written directive was issued regarding the preparation of this operation in order to maintain secrecy. However, the commanders of the 3rd and 4th shock armies were assigned tasks for its preparation.”

The closest reserves of the Wehrmacht amounted to up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

In an effort to hold onto Belarus at all costs, the Nazi command concentrated enormous forces here and created a powerful, defense in depth. Cities and towns were transformed into strongholds. A perimeter defense was created around Vitebsk and other large settlements, which consisted of several trench-type defensive lines. Defensive structures were erected along the banks of the rivers.

Despite the generally favorable situation, the future operation seemed to be a difficult undertaking. Here is how I. Kh. Bagromyan assessed the situation on the fronts: “By the beginning of October 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front was generally favorable for the Red Army. The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached the approaches to Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. The Central, Voronezh and The steppe fronts reached the middle reaches of the Dnieper and crossed it everywhere, with the task of continuing the liberation of Ukraine and southern Belarus. By the same time, the troops of our Bryansk Front, having defeated a large enemy group, advanced 250 kilometers, reaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper north of Gomel " .

The idea of the operation was to quickly break through the German defenses, capture Nevel with a swift attack and take advantageous positions for further fighting. Suddenness and swiftness of action were of decisive importance. Any delay could lead to the failure of the operation, since in this case the German command would have time to transfer reserves to the threatened direction and strengthen the defense.

The difficulty in carrying out the operation lay, first of all, in the fact that the Nazis were able to significantly strengthen the Nevel area. A. I. Eremenko recalls: “Occupying defense in this area for 9–10 months, they created a well-developed engineering system of trenches, trenches, and full-profile communication passages. The dugouts and bunkers had ceilings of several rolls. Our artillery reconnaissance spotted a large number of reserve positions for machine guns, mortars and guns.”

The main goal of the offensive operation, in addition to occupying an important point, was to provide conditions for further actions in the direction of Gorodok and Vitebsk. The commander of the Kalinin Front recalled: “When planning the Nevelsk operation, it was intended to ensure a general offensive of the front in the direction of Vitebsk, as well as to create conditions for the development of success in the southern direction to Gorodok, in the northern and northwestern direction - to capture the Novosokolniki resistance center. The attack on Nevel, in addition, distracted significant German forces; its success would have disrupted the enemy’s entire communications system.”

The main role in the offensive was to be played by the 3rd Shock Army. To ensure the solution of the main task of the operation, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky included in the strike group four of the existing six rifle divisions, two of the three rifle brigades, all tanks and almost all of the army’s artillery. These forces were concentrated in a 4-kilometer area. The defense of the remaining 100-kilometer section of the army's front was entrusted to the remaining forces. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the option of deep operational formation of a strike group was chosen. The first echelon, intended to break through the German defense, included the 28th and 357th rifle divisions, reinforced by two mortar regiments. To develop success after breaking through the defense, the 78th Tank Brigade, the 21st Guards Rifle Division and three artillery regiments were assigned. The reserve (third echelon) consisted of the 46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades. The operation plan included 5 stages. At the first stage, it was necessary to secretly concentrate troops intended for the offensive in the initial areas and complete the accumulation of material resources, primarily ammunition, necessary for the operation. At the second stage, the troops quickly and secretly occupied their starting position in close proximity to the front line. The third stage included artillery preparation, attack, breaking through enemy defenses to a depth of 6-7 km to the river. Sixth, ensuring the entry into the breakthrough of the development echelon of success, which at the fourth stage, with a swift blow, was supposed to capture the inter-lake defile on the approaches to Nevel and take possession of the city. At the fifth stage, it was necessary to gain a foothold north and west of Nevel, organize a strong defense and be ready to repel counterattacks from suitable enemy reserves.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky writes in his memoirs: “According to the artillery support plan for the operation, 814 guns and mortars were concentrated in the breakthrough area, which amounted to 91% of all those available in the army. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery and mortar batteries, suppressing firing points at the front line and in the depths of the defense, preventing counterattacks and preventing the approach of reserves. The artillery operations were organized as an artillery offensive, in which 1.5 hours were allocated for artillery preparation and 35 minutes for accompanying the attack with a barrage of fire.”

In order to prevent a strike on the flank of the advancing army of K.N. Galitsky and cover its actions, the 4th shock army was supposed to advance south of Nevel. The attack was carried out by the 360th and 47th rifle divisions in the direction of Lake Ezerishche and further to Gorodok. The success was to be developed by the 236th and 143rd tank brigades. Their main task was to cut the Gorodok-Nevel highway.

For air support of the troops, the 211th attack and 240th fighter aviation divisions were allocated from the 3rd Air Army. While the infantry was preparing for the attack, the pilots had to carry out bombing and assault strikes on strong points located in the direction of the main attack. In the future, attack aircraft, under the cover of fighters, were to ensure the advancement of the 28th Infantry Division and the breakthrough development echelon. In addition, aviation was entrusted with the task of providing air cover for the strike group, disrupting enemy railway communications in the Polotsk-Dretun and Nevel-Gorodok sections, and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Pustoshka and Vitebsk in order to timely detect suitable German reserves.

From the memoirs of A.I. Eremenko: “By the end of the day on October 5, the troops were given the last orders to attack. Its start was scheduled for 10 o'clock on October 6, 1943.

By 3 o'clock on October 6, units and subunits of the 357th and 28th rifle divisions took their starting position and dug in 300 m from the enemy trenches. The sappers were finishing making passages in the minefields and cutting the wire. The enemy set up ambushes in two passes in the sector of the 28th division; sappers and infantry cover spotted them in a timely manner and drove them off with fire.”

In the very first hours, the operation achieved a favorable result for the Red Army. A breakthrough was quickly formed, where the tanks rushed; individual pockets of stubborn resistance were suppressed by the tactical advantage of the attackers. A. I. Eremenko recalled the results of the first day of the operation: “As a result of the successful actions of our troops on the first day of the operation, units of the 263rd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions of the Nazis were driven out from the lines they were occupying. The German command began hastily bringing new units from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. On October 7, units of the 58th Infantry Division appeared north of Nevel, arriving from the Krasnovaldaysk region, from the Volkhov Front sector.”

Careful two-month preparation led to the completion of the main task of the operation in one day. The Soviet command managed to hide the large-scale preparations for the operation, which allowed for surprise and ultimately led to success.

On October 8, 1943, soldiers of the 84th Rifle Corps (commander General S.A. Knyazkov) and a maneuver group led by Colonel P.F. Dremov liberated the settlement. Liozno. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, five formations and units of the front were given the honorary names “Liozny”.

The Headquarters directive dated October 16, 1943 noted: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not complete their assigned task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10. One of the reasons for this is the disorganized offensive of the front troops. The offensive is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, by separate armies on separate sectors of the front, which gives the enemy the opportunity to maneuver with his own forces and create powerful defense lines.

With the loss of Nevel, the Wehrmacht lost a major road junction, which fundamentally disrupted its entire communications system in this sector of the front and made it difficult to maneuver reserves. Subsequently, the gap in the German defense created by the penetration of Soviet troops caused a lot of concern to the German command. Hitler repeatedly demanded that the breakthrough be eliminated, but all attempts to carry out his order ended in failure. K. Tippelskirch wrote: “This gap has turned into a bleeding wound at the junction of both army groups.”

The commander of the Kalinin Front, E. A. Eremenko, writes in his memoirs: “As a result, the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 4th shock armies brilliantly completed the task assigned to them. The city of Nevel, which had been under the heel of the German occupiers since July 16, 1941, was returned to the Motherland.”

Thus, on October 6, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the right-flank armies of the Kalinin Front - the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies (commanders K.M. Galitsky and V.I. Shvetsov) went on the offensive. They delivered the main attack on Vitebsk from the north through Nevel at the junction of army groups “Center” and “North”. After two days of fighting, on October 7, a large center of enemy resistance, the city of Nevel was liberated. 320 settlements were also cleared. The main evidence of the events are the memoirs of A. I. Eremenko and K. M. Galitsky, who described in detail all the nuances of the operation.

After the victory at Nevel, the Wehrmacht command began to take all possible actions to prevent the development of the Red Army offensive and the possible liberation of Vitebsk.

Weather conditions played into the hands of the Nazis at the end of October - beginning of November. From the memoirs of I. Kh. Bagramyan, one can glean that “the conditions for conducting active combat operations in November 1943 in the direction of Vitebsk were extremely bad. The front commander wrote: “In the south of Belarus there are relatively favorable weather conditions, but here we have impassable mud. Due to the lack of roads, we cannot supply the troops with enough ammunition. And Hitler transferred two infantry divisions from near Leningrad, five infantry and one tank division from the southern wing of Army Group Center, exactly from where Rokossovsky was operating, to the front line of action. The enemy has also significantly replenished its aviation..."

Army General A.I. Eremenko noted the importance of the upcoming offensive operation in the direction of Polotsk-Vitebsk. In his memoirs, he wrote: “The front faced a serious task - the further development of the offensive in the Polotsk-Vitebsk direction. It was attended by the 4th Shock Corps, the 43rd and 39th Armies, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, as well as the 5th Tank Corps, which was placed at the disposal of the front later and brought into battle on November 16 to build on the success.”

From the very beginning, the operation began to lag behind planned plans. All researchers and contemporaries see two reasons for this: weather conditions that paralyzed the supply of troops and their ability to maneuver during the offensive, the second reason, as noted by Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin: “Eremenko’s indecisiveness.”

E. A. Eremenko describes his last operation as front commander: “... the right flank of the troops of the 4th Shock Army advanced to a depth of 55 km and captured the line of Klinovskaya, Nadruzhno, Podmishnevy, Gorodok. Thus, the front troops took an overhanging position in relation to the northern flank of the enemy’s Vitebsk group. However, on the left flank, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies advanced only 10–15 km. In order to develop the success of the troops of the right flank (4th Shock Army), on November 18, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps of General N. S. Oslikovsky was brought into battle, but due to muddy roads, its strike was not effective enough. It was necessary to comprehensively analyze the current situation in order to find a direction that was vulnerable to the enemy.”

It should be noted that the description of military operations in which Soviet troops fought unsuccessful battles is extremely fragmentary in the memoirs of military leaders, in contrast to operations in which the Red Army achieved success.

In mid-October 1943, the troops of the Central (from October 20, Belorussian) Front began to move forward in the Gomel-Bobruisk direction.

On October 20, the Central Front was renamed the Belorussian Front. The front commander, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky, decided to temporarily stop the offensive of the 65th and 61st armies and ordered them to gain a foothold in their occupied positions.

In an interview for the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Gomel, K. K. Rokossovsky noted: “From the second half of October, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Central Front was renamed the Belarusian Front and received the main task: to begin the operation to liberate Belarus from the Nazi invaders. To carry out this large and complex operation, it was, of course, necessary, first of all, to ensure a starting position for the troops, which is what our efforts were aimed at. This task included the liberation of Gomel. The frontal offensive used, as I said above, was not successful. The city and its approaches were heavily fortified. On this section of the front, the Nazis created a dense grouping of forces. The terrain facilitated the maneuvering of reserves from the depths and along the front, which the enemy made extensive use of. All this required a change in the nature of the actions of our troops. Our offensive began on a wide front. It was attended by the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov, which operated north of Gomel, the 63rd Army of General Kolpakchi - it acted directly in the direction of Gomel, the 48th Army of General Romanenko - south of Gomel in the area between the Sozh and Dnieper rivers, and on the left flank - 65th Army of General Batov."

Meanwhile, the transfer of front-line reserves to the Loyev bridgehead continued - the 1st Guards Don Tank Corps of Major General Tank Forces B.S. Bakharav, the 2nd and 7th Guards Corps of Major Generals V.V. Kryukov and M.P. Konstantinov, 4th Artillery Corps, Major General of Artillery N.V. Ignatov. The main forces of the 48th Army were also transported to the western bank of the Dnieper. The 11th Army, which was transferred to the Belorussian Front from the reserve of the Supreme High Command, together with the 63rd Army, was preparing to strike in the center of the front on Gomel and south of the regional center in the direction of Zhlobin.

Eyewitnesses of the events recalled: “After the Battle of Oryol-Kursk, our pontooners hoped to get some respite. People who were exhausted from round-the-clock offensive battles needed it so much. But what kind of respite could we be talking about? The troops of the Central Front, having broken through the heavily fortified German defenses near Orel, quickly advanced to the borders of Belarus. Therefore, we, barely having time to put the crossing equipment in order, immediately crossed the Desna in the Bryansk region, and then ensured the crossing of the advancing troops across the Iput River and, as part of the Belorussian Front, reached the Sozh River in the Novobelitsa area near Gomel.”

Marshal of the Secular Union K.K. Rokossovsky characterized the military actions preceding the operation to liberate Gomel as follows: “The liberation of Gomel was preceded by the following events. After the defeat of the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge, the troops of the Central Front, pursuing the retreating enemy and overcoming all his attempts to stop our advance, fought to the Dnieper River in the second half of September. Having crossed the water line, the left-flank armies captured a bridgehead on the western bank in the area of Dymer and Chernobyl (north of Kyiv). At the same time, the troops of the right flank and center of the front, breaking the ever-increasing resistance of the enemy 9th Army formations, developed an offensive in the Gomel and Zhlobin directions. Having reached the border of the Pronya and Sozh rivers, our troops crossed these rivers with battles in early October and captured bridgeheads on their western banks north of Gomel. In the Gomel direction, we completely cleared the left bank of the Sozh River and crossed it south of the city.

In his work, a contemporary of the events, N.A. Antipenko, noted: “During the previous two months of the offensive in the general direction of Kiev, we managed to concentrate our bases, warehouses, and repair agencies on the Kursk-Lgov-Konotop-Bakhmach railway; Now everything had to be transported as soon as possible to another railway direction: Bryansk - Unecha - Gomel. Until then, I had never encountered such a problem. And now she stood up with all the poignancy and urgency.

In October - November there was still a lot of mud. It was almost hopeless to rely on the refurbishment of front-line warehouses, hospitals, repair bases and other things by road transport: there were no roads and there was not enough fuel. The main burden of the reloading fell on railway transport.

The head of military communications at the front, Colonel A.G. Chernyakov, having collected applications from all branches of the military and services for the required number of cars, excitedly reported to me: we need 7,500 cars! That's almost 200 trains! Where can I get them? Moreover, the capacity of the railway railways at that time did not exceed 12 pairs of trains per day. But in addition to our own transportation, we also had to accept trains constantly coming from the center with weapons, ammunition, and fuel.

It must be said that the condition of the Belarusian Railway at that moment was extremely poor. The enemy, retreating, destroyed everything in its path, trying to hold back the advance of the troops. The road was in ruins. The Gomel hub, well developed and equipped before the war, was completely destroyed. Rails, sleepers, equipment - almost everything was taken away, and station buildings and power plants were turned into a pile of stone. To destroy the upper structure of the track, the Nazis used special mechanical destroyers that plowed up the roadbed and broke the sleepers in the middle; Almost every abandoned rail was torn to pieces by explosives.

Workers of the Belarusian Railway, led by their chief, General N.I. Krasev, relentlessly followed the advancing Soviet troops and immediately began repairing the liberated sections. By November 15, 1943, demining of the road control was completed.”

Until November, the German command concentrated three armies in the Gomel area and created additional defensive fortifications.

The joint operation of the troops of the Belorussian Front and partisan formations was to cut off the enemy group of forces in the Gomel area with attacks from the south and north and, depriving it of reserves, force it to retreat. The main blow from the south was delivered by the 65th Army of Lieutenant General P.I. Batov. It was supported by two tank and two cavalry corps. The task was to exit in the direction of Rechitsa-Glusk. This made it possible to cut off enemy forces that were concentrated in the Gomel area.

The main objectives of the Gomel-Rechitsa operation were the defeat of a large enemy group between the Sozh and Dnieper rivers, the occupation of convenient positions on the western bank of the Dnieper with the goal of subsequently liberating the rest of Belarus.

The Soviet troops (numbering over 750 thousand people) were opposed by the 2nd, part of the 9th and 4th German armies of the Center group (commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), a little later this group was reinforced by 7 infantry divisions and SS brigade.

The Nazis, skillfully using the advantages of the defended terrain, skillfully maneuvered their troops, managed to create a powerful defense center in the Gomel region. Therefore, the main blow was supposed to be delivered from the bridgehead at Loev by part of the forces of the 48th (General Romanenko), 65th (General Batov) and 61st (General Belov) armies in the direction of Rechitsa with subsequent access to the rear of the enemy group.

The offensive in the direction of the main attack, as planned, began on November 10 at 11 o’clock after 40 minutes of preparation and air strikes by units of the 16th Air Army (General S.I. Rudenko).

On November 10, after artillery preparation and an air strike on enemy positions, the left group of troops of the Belorussian Front went on the offensive. This was the beginning of the Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation. The rifle corps of the 48th, 65th and 61st armies broke through the enemy defenses on the first day. On the second day, the 1st Guards and 9th Tank Corps, 2nd and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps were introduced into the breakthrough. The main direction of their actions was Rechitsa. Part of the forces was sent to Kalinkovichi. Units of the 42nd Rifle Corps (48th Army) successfully overcame the resistance of the Nazis. They advanced along the western bank of the Dnieper and liberated several settlements in the direction of Rechitsa.

The speed and power of the attacking troops on each flank of the front made it possible to cut the Gomel-Kalinkovichi railway line on November 15, and to liberate Rechitsa on November 18. By November 20, the troops advanced to a depth of 70 km, reached the Berezina River and, having crossed it, captured a bridgehead south of Zhlobin and bypassed Gomel from the west. On November 18, the troops who participated in the liberation of Rechitsa were thanked by order of the Supreme High Command and a salute was given in Moscow with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns. This was the first fireworks for the liberation of cities on the territory of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War.

The direct assault on the Gomel positions by troops of the 11th and 63rd armies was unsuccessful. In this direction, in the second half of November, the offensive was suspended, and systematic preparations for a new onslaught began.

The troops of the right wing of the front advanced more successfully. On November 25, troops of the 3rd and 50th armies liberated Propoisk (now Slavgorod), Korma, Zhuravichi and reached the Dnieper in the Novy Bykhov area, covering Gomel from the north.

After the 19th Rifle Corps of the 65th Army, in cooperation with the Guards Don Tank Corps, knocked out the Germans from the Demakhi station on November 14 and thereby cut the Kalinkovichi-Gomel railway, the enemy front was torn apart, a large group of fascist troops was under threat of encirclement . On November 18, the Nazis were driven out of Rechitsa.

On November 17, the 3rd Army of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 50th Army of General I.V. Boldin launched an offensive north of Gomel. They crossed Sozh, captured Krichev, Cherikov, Prapoysk (Slavgorod). Simultaneous significant attacks were carried out directly on Gomel by the 11th Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 63rd Army of General V. Ya. Kalpakchi. They received support from the right-flank units of the 48th Army.

On November 22, the Nazi defenses in the Kostyukovka area were broken through. Units of the 11th and 63rd reached the Gomel-Zhlobin railway and the Gomel-Mogilev highway. The fighting here was extremely tough. Success largely depended on the actions of the artillery. And they showed their best side. Thus, only from November 12 to 17, a special crew of the battery of Senior Lieutenant A. Landyshev destroyed about 100 fascist soldiers and officers, suppressed 8 mortar crews with fire, and knocked out 2 vehicles with ammunition.

By the evening of November 25, the troops of the Belorussian Front approached Gomel from three sides. The threat of encirclement forced the Nazis on the night of November 26 to begin withdrawing their troops from the area between the Sozh and Dnieper rivers.

On the morning of November 26, 1943, units of the 217th Infantry Division (commander - Colonel N. Masonov) and 96th Infantry Division (Colonel F. Bulatov) entered the city. At the same time, units of the 7th Infantry Division (Colonel D. Vorobyov) and 102nd Infantry Division (Major General A. Andreev) entered the city from the south-eastern direction.

Early in the morning, Corporal Mikhail Vasiliev planted a liberation flag on the building of the city power plant, and Lieutenant Grigory Kirilov, a literary employee of the army newspaper “Banner of the Soviets” of the 11th Army, on the fire tower.

Batov recalls: “Two brigades of the Guards Don Tank Corps, in cooperation with the 37th Guards and 162nd Siberian Divisions, struck Rechitsa from the north-west, broke into the city and started a battle in the streets. The rifle corps of the 48th Army was advancing from the east . He pinned down significant enemy forces intended for the defense of the city. We captured Rechitsa almost without losses, did not allow the enemy to destroy the city, captured rich trophies and many prisoners. The battle for Rechitsa is one of the examples of the organization of interaction between the troops of the two armies, which jointly liberated city. Moreover, this battle also provides an example of the interaction of regular and partisan troops in the offensive. After the corps of D. I. Samarsky and the tankers of M. F. Panov captured the Demekhi station on November 14, the enemy front was torn apart, and to the north of the station our attackers The units united with the partisan brigades of I. P. Kozhar.The partisans reliably covered the left flank of the army, provided valuable information about the enemy garrison of Rechitsa and, together with our troops, participated in the liberation of the city.

A surprise attack from the rear for the enemy allowed our army, together with the left flank formations of P. L. Romanenko’s army, to encircle the enemy group. A few days later she partially surrendered. The main part of the enemy forces in the 48th Army sector broke through to join the Gomel group."

During the 20 days of the Gomel-Rechitsa operation, troops of the Belorussian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in a 100 km wide zone, inflicting huge losses on him, and advanced to a depth of 130 km, creating a threat to the southern flank of Army Group Center, making it difficult for it to interact with Army Group South. . During this successful operation, our troops suffered serious losses. 21,650 soldiers and officers were killed, over 60 thousand were wounded.

Soviet troops reached the Chausy line, south of Novy Bykhov, east of Rogachev and Mozyr, south of Yelsk. At this point, the front stabilized until the summer of 1944. During the Gomel-Rechitsa operation, favorable preconditions were created for the further liberation of Belarus.

For the courage and heroism shown during the liberation of Gomel, the VTK, NPO of the USSR ordered 23 formations and units to be given the name “Gomel”. Units of the 3rd, 11th, 48th armies of generals I.I. Fedyuninsky, A.V. Gorbatov, P.L. Romanenko, and pilots of the 16th Air Army of General S.I. Rudenko especially distinguished themselves.

By order of the Supreme High Command of November 26, 1943, gratitude was expressed to these military formations and units. 17 people were awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, tens of thousands of soldiers were awarded orders and medals.

In Moscow, an artillery salute was given with 20 salvoes from 224 guns. The 822-day occupation ended. The time has come for the revival of Gomel. Regarding the significance of Gomel-Rechitskaya, it should be said that from the end of 1943, after the operation to liberate Gomel, many German military leaders had doubts about the possibility of offensive operations.

On December 13, an offensive began on the right flank of the Soviet troops stationed on the border of Belarus - the Gorodok offensive operation of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I. Kh. Bagramyan.

“On the morning of December 13,” recalls the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagromyan, “on the day of our offensive it became warmer again, the sky became cloudy, visibility deteriorated to critical, and the commander of the 3rd Air Army, Lieutenant General of Aviation M.P. Papivin reported to me that it would be very difficult to use aviation. Thus, the artillery task became more complicated... The artillery preparation of the front line, which began at 9.00, lasted two hours, but with interruptions, because there was not enough ammunition. Then the fire was transferred to the depths of the defense. At the same time, the rifle units moved into the attack.”

To stop the advance of the Soviet troops, the Nazi command transferred new reinforcements to Vitebsk - two infantry divisions. Relying on the defensive lines with which Gorodok was fortified, the enemy offered stubborn resistance. Three lines of defense were created on the approaches to the city.

In the direction of the operation, the Soviet command was waiting for frosts that could facilitate the advancement of tanks and other equipment through the swampy terrain. However, the tankmen of the 5th Tank Corps, operating here as part of the 1st Baltic Front, also sought other ways to overcome the swamps. So, if in Rokossovsky’s troops the infantrymen made peculiar “wet-foot” skis, then the tankmen of Bagramyan’s 5th Tank Tank mounted special additional plates on the tracks, increasing their width by about 1.5 times. The tanks carried fascines, logs, and additional cables.

The enemy held 1 tank division and 8 infantry divisions on the Gorodok ledge, and also had 120 tanks and 800 guns and mortars here. The 5th Tank Corps already had experience in fighting in this direction, and not entirely successfully. In November 1943, the 24th brigade of the corps, fighting a night battle (one of the new tactical methods of Soviet tank crews), broke into Gorodok. However, it was not possible to consolidate and develop success then.

On December 13, the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Army (which included the 5th Tank Corps) began the Gorodok offensive operation. The 4th Army, unlike the 11th Guards, was able to break through the main line of enemy defense. However, the pace of the offensive soon slowed down - Soviet troops came under fire from 25 enemy batteries, and the actions of the tanks were complicated by the onset of a thaw. But on December 14, the 1st Tank Corps was brought into battle on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army. On December 16, he reached the Bychikha station, where he linked up with the 5th Tank Corps. Thus the encirclement of the enemy's 4 infantry divisions was completed. Skillfully holding back the pressure of enemy tanks trying to break through the encirclement ring, the 41st Tank Brigade of Colonel P.I. Korchagin of the 5th Tank Tank. The tank crews of the 70th Tank Brigade showed particular courage in the battle for the station. The tank of junior lieutenant V.V. Kunitsa, for example, rammed an enemy train trying to leave the station.

The commander of the 1st Baltic Front, I. Kh. Bagromyan, wrote: “Despite unsatisfactory weather conditions, which were completely excluded by the actions of our aviation, the 11th Guards, 4th Shock and 43rd armies broke through the German defenses on a 15-kilometer section of the front and On December 16, we advanced 25 km deep into the enemy’s defenses. The 1st and 5th Tank Corps brought into battle (commanders Generals V.V. Butikov, M.G. Sakhno) surrounded units of the enemy’s 4th Infantry Division in the area of Bychikha station , which was defeated. Until December 20, Soviet troops liberated more than 500 settlements.

Army General I. Kh. Bagromyan also pointed out in his memoirs the failures during the offensive operation. So he noted: “Nevertheless, we did not achieve the full expected successes. The town was not taken, and our plan to encircle the main enemy forces defending on its outskirts was in jeopardy. The enemy skillfully maneuvered and stubbornly resisted. The matter also became more complicated. "the need to withdraw the 1st Tank Corps from the battle. Unfortunately, shortcomings in the command and control of the troops also emerged. I had to go to the command post of K. N. Galitsky and provide him with assistance on the spot."

Marshal Bagramyan recalls: “The decisive battle for Gorodok began on December 23, 1943. Before the attack, reconnaissance in force was carried out. It identified the most dangerous centers of German resistance. At 11.00 o’clock on December 23, artillery preparation began. After an hour’s artillery preparation, formations of the 11th Guards went on the offensive and the 43rd Army. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out in the trenches and passages of formations. The battle lasted 36 hours, and was fought not only during the day, but also at night."

The attack was not easy; the Nazis clung to the city, which was an important strategic railway junction. I. Kh. Bagramyan recalled: “The attack of the guards was fierce and unstoppable. Having crossed the riverbed on ice, they broke into the northern outskirts of the city. The battalion of senior lieutenant S. Ternavsky was the first to do this. The fighters of the battalion operating nearby also performed well in the night battle Senior Lieutenant F. Merkulov He and his deputy commander, Captain Rudnev, were inseparably in the ranks of the attackers, inspiring them by personal example.

Having burst into the city, both of these units fought assertively and boldly: breaking through to the flanks and rear of strong points, they fired at them with continuous mortar and machine-gun fire. Suffering heavy losses and fearing isolation and encirclement, the fascist garrisons began to flee. Seeing this and not having free reserves, the enemy command withdrew part of the forces from the eastern front of the city perimeter. This was immediately used by Major General A.I. Maksimov, commander of the 11th Guards Division. He put machine gunners on several tanks assigned to him and threw them on the south-eastern outskirts of the city. In a short but fierce battle, tankers and machine gunners knocked out the Nazis, who were holed up in stone houses turned into pillboxes."

On the evening of December 24, Moscow saluted the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, who stormed the city and the large Gorodok railway station. In total, during the Gorodok operation, 1220 settlements were liberated, more than 65,000 were destroyed and 3.3 thousand Nazis were captured.

On December 24, the town was taken. In the battles near Gorodok, the 5th Tank Corps suffered heavy losses. So, in the 24th brigade only 12 tanks remained in service. The experience of the Gorodok battles also showed that in the conditions of a swampy and wooded area, a timely, quickly and secretly carried out maneuver was of exceptional importance. And what is also very important is continuous artillery support of combat vehicles throughout the entire depth of their operations to suppress enemy defenses. Therefore, here each tank battalion, as a rule, was assigned a battery, and sometimes 2 batteries of self-propelled guns. This made it possible to move forward faster, carry out wide maneuvers, unexpectedly launch frontal and flank attacks on the enemy, and capture large populated areas.

During the Gorodok operation, in the most difficult terrain and weather conditions, overcoming exceptionally stubborn German resistance, front troops liberated over 1,220 settlements, destroyed over 65,000 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 3,300 Nazis, and captured a lot of military equipment and other military equipment.

The main executor of the Gorodok operation, I. Kh. Bagromyan, recalled: “The Gorodok operation, not large in scale, remains in my memory as one of the most difficult among those carried out under my leadership during the last war. This is due not only to the fact that it was the first of those carried out by me as front commander. There were many purely objective reasons that determined its complexity. Firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in extremely difficult conditions against large enemy forces, which, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified themselves in an area favorable for defense, which dominated the initial the position of our troops."

Thus, it is obvious that the offensive operations in the fall - December 1943 were important both militarily and politically.

The Nazis pinned great hopes on the autumn thaw and the lack of roads in this wooded and swampy area. The fascist generals, not without reason, believed that in the mud and slush, Soviet troops would not be able to overcome the defenses and successfully advance along broken dirt roads.

But, despite their calculations, the Red Army's offensive began in October and was waged on a wide front until the end of 1943.

Commanders

Nevel offensive operation- front-line offensive operation of the Red Army against German troops during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from October 6 to October 10, 1943 by part of the forces of the Kalinin Front with the goal of capturing Nevel and disrupting enemy communications on the northern wing of the Soviet-German front.

Situation

German defense

German defensive fortifications in the Nevel area (December 1943)

The German defense was a system of strong strongholds and resistance centers located in terrain with a large number of lakes and deep ravines. From an engineering point of view, the defense was well prepared and included a developed system of trenches, trenches, full-profile communication trenches, as well as dugouts and bunkers with ceilings of several ramps. A large number of reserve positions were equipped for machine guns, mortars and guns. In the direction where the Soviet troops intended to deliver the main attack, more than 100 firing points, up to 80 dugouts, 16-20 mortar positions, 12 artillery batteries and 12-16 individual guns were located. In addition, up to 8 artillery batteries could fire from neighboring areas. The front line of the defense was covered by two strips of minefields 40-60 m deep and two rows of wire barriers. The second defensive line ran along the river. Six. The total tactical depth of defense was 6-7 km.

The closest reserves of the Wehrmacht amounted to up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

Composition and strengths of the parties

USSR

Part of the forces of the Kalinin Front:

357th Rifle Division (Major General A.L. Kronik)
28th Rifle Division (Colonel M. F. Bukshtynovich)
21st Guards Rifle Division (Major General D. V. Mikhailov)
78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin)
46th Guards Rifle Division (Major General S. I. Karapetyan)
100th Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.I. Serebryakov)
31st Rifle Brigade (Colonel L.A. Bakuev)

2nd Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov)
- 360th Rifle Division (Colonel I. I. Chinnov)
- 117th Rifle Division (Major General E. G. Koberidze)
- 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division (Major General V. A. Karvelis)
Part of the forces of the 83rd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. A. Dyakonov)
- 47th Rifle Division (Major General V. G. Chernov)
236th Tank Brigade (Colonel N.D. Chuprov)
143rd Tank Brigade (Colonel A. S. Podkovsky)

240th Fighter Aviation Division (Colonel G.V. Zimin)
211th Assault Aviation Division (Colonel P. M. Kuchma)

Germany

At 10:00, the infantry of the 28th and 357th Infantry Divisions of the 3rd Shock Army rose to attack and entered the battle to capture the first trench. At the same time, the artillery shifted fire deep into the enemy’s defenses. In certain sections of the front, Soviet artillery managed to completely suppress enemy firing points, which allowed the infantry to overcome the front line on the move and start a battle in the second German trench. An hour after the start of the attack, units of the 28th Infantry Division broke through the German defenses in a 2.5 km area and advanced up to 2 km in depth. In the zone of action of the 357th Infantry Division, the German defense was not completely destroyed by artillery fire; the attackers encountered strong resistance and were unable to advance.

The offensive began successfully in the 4th Shock Army. The 360th and 47th rifle divisions also went on the attack at 10 o'clock on October 6 after almost an hour and a half of artillery and air preparation. Without encountering serious resistance, they soon captured the first lines of trenches. At about 11:30, the 236th Tank Brigade of Colonel N.D. Chuprov was brought into battle. After 20 minutes, the second mobile group, led by the commander of the 143rd Tank Brigade, Colonel A.S. Podkovsky, rushed into the breakthrough. The tank crews were tasked with cutting the Nevel-Gorodok highway.

The stubborn resistance of the Nazis in front of the front of the 357th Infantry Division of the 3rd Shock Army threatened to disrupt the entire operation, in which the main factor for success was to be the speed of the offensive. In the current situation, the commander of the 3rd Shock Army decided to use the success of the 28th Infantry Division to introduce a breakthrough development echelon into battle. The 78th Tank Brigade, one regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division in vehicles and reinforcement units rushed forward. Following them, the remaining two regiments of the 21st Guards Division moved on foot. The breakthrough development echelon was headed by Major General Mikhailov. Minefields and marshy areas lying in the path of the attackers greatly reduced the pace of the advance. To overcome them, sapper units were used; infantrymen literally dragged vehicles through the mud and swamps on their hands. By 2 p.m., parts of the breakthrough development echelon overcame the enemy’s defenses and soon, ahead of the retreating German units, reached the Shestikha River and captured bridges across it. The offensive progressed successfully. Individual pockets of resistance encountered along the way were suppressed by fire from ground forces and attack aircraft. The raids of enemy bombers were repelled by anti-aircraft gunners and covering fighters. By 16 o'clock the advance detachment reached Nevel. Taken by surprise, the German garrison was unable to organize resistance and the battle in the city quickly ended. After occupying the railway station, 1,600 Nevelsk residents were released from two trains prepared for shipment to Germany. At 16:40, the commander of the 78th Tank Brigade, Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin, sent a report to army headquarters about the capture of Nevel. Success was achieved so quickly that front commander A.I. Eremenko doubted the accuracy of the report. K.N. Galitsky confirmed the information with a personal report and proposed developing an offensive against Idritsa and Polotsk. But A.I. Eremenko, given the tense situation on the Kalinin Front, did not support him and ordered to consolidate the success achieved. By the end of the day, units had secured a foothold to the north-west and west of the city.

As a result of the first day of the operation, the troops of the 3rd and 4th shock armies completed their tasks and drove out units of the 263rd Infantry and 2nd Airfield Divisions of the Nazis from their occupied lines. Parrying the blow, the German command hastily began to pull up reinforcements from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. Beginning on October 7, units of the 58th and 122nd Infantry Divisions, as well as the 281st Security Division, began to appear in the combat area. Approaching troops began to make attempts to regain lost positions. At the same time, from October 7, the activity of German aviation began to increase sharply, which on that day carried out 305 combat sorties. Continuously increasing, the number of combat sorties reached 900 by October 11. Fighting broke out in the air with pilots of the 240th Fighter Aviation Division.

Wehrmacht soldiers prepare for defense in the Nevel area (December 1943)

The Soviet command, in turn, sought to develop the offensive. To do this, the commander of the 3rd Shock Army brought the 31st Rifle Brigade into battle on the night of October 7, which by the morning widened the gap in the German defense to 10-12 km. In the afternoon of the same day, the 360th Infantry Division and the 236th Tank Brigade from the 4th Shock Army broke enemy resistance in one of the large defense centers, reached Lake Ezerishche and began to bypass it from the north and south. Soon the troops advancing on the right flank of the army managed to reach the Gorodok-Nevel highway and cut it off.

On the morning of October 8, fierce battles broke out with counterattacking German troops throughout the entire zone of the Soviet offensive. On the Soviet side, the 46th Guards Rifle Division was brought into the battle, and on the German side, the reserves arrived, with a total strength of at least two divisions. The Germans launched particularly strong attacks on the positions of the 21st Guards Rifle Division and the 100th Rifle Brigade, which occupied the defense northwest of Nevel. During an intense battle that lasted many hours, Wehrmacht units initially managed to break through to the location of Soviet troops and approach the city, but a timely organized counterattack soon allowed the situation to be restored. All subsequent attacks were also repulsed.

On October 9 and 10, intense fighting continued in all directions. The German command sought to regain lost positions. The Soviet troops, in turn, tried to hold the occupied lines and even expand the breakthrough front. And in a number of areas this was successful. On October 9, units of the 28th Infantry Division broke through to Lake Bolshoi Ivan and took up an inter-lake defile, which significantly improved the position of the defending units north of Nevel. On the night of October 10, the 46th Guards Rifle Division achieved significant success in its direction. These days, in the zone of the 4th Shock Army, the 117th and 16th Lithuanian Rifle Divisions entered the battle to repel German counterattacks.

By October 11, the group of German troops had strengthened significantly due to the approaching reserves, and numerical superiority passed to the side of the Wehrmacht. Further advance of the Red Army units was stopped. In the current situation, the front commander ordered the troops to go on the defensive.

During the operation, the partisans provided active support to the advancing troops. By their actions they disrupted German communications and delayed the approach of reserves.

Losses

Germany

During the battles, German troops lost over 7,400 people, 8 tanks, 236 guns, 215 mortars, and more than 600 vehicles. The 2nd Luftwaffe Airfield Division suffered such heavy losses that it was disbanded.

USSR

There is no data on the losses of Soviet troops.

Results of the operation

This gap became a bleeding wound at the junction of both army groups.

Preparations for the operation began long before it began. Despite the fact that Headquarters did not officially give orders for development, the operation was developed before the troops entered conditional positions. A.I. Eremenko recalls: “With the end of the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front developed an offensive against Vitebsk. The Nevelsk operation came next, which we had also planned in advance. No written directive was issued regarding the preparation of this operation in order to maintain secrecy. However, the commanders of the 3rd and 4th shock armies were assigned tasks for its preparation.”

The closest reserves of the Wehrmacht amounted to up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

Despite the generally favorable situation, the future operation seemed to be a difficult undertaking. This is how I.Kh. assessed the situation on the fronts. Bagromyan: “By the beginning of October 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front was generally favorable for the Red Army. The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached the approaches to Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. The Central, Voronezh and Stepnoy fronts reached the middle reaches of the Dnieper and crossed everywhere him, having the task of continuing the liberation of Ukraine and the south of Belarus. By the same time, the troops of our Bryansk Front, having defeated a large enemy group, advanced 250 kilometers, reaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper north of Gomel."

The difficulty in carrying out the operation lay, first of all, in the fact that the Nazis were able to significantly strengthen the Nevel area. A.I. Eremenko recalls: “Occupying defense in this area for 9-10 months, they created a well-developed engineering system of trenches, trenches, and full-profile communication trenches. The dugouts and bunkers had ceilings of several rolls. Our artillery reconnaissance spotted a large number of reserve positions for machine guns, mortars and guns."

The main goal of the offensive operation, in addition to occupying an important point, was to provide conditions for further actions in the direction of Gorodok and Vitebsk. The commander of the Kalinin Front recalled: “When planning the Nevelsk operation, it was intended to ensure a general offensive of the front in the direction of Vitebsk, as well as to create conditions for developing success in the southern direction to Gorodok, in the northern and northwestern direction - to capture the Novosokolniki resistance center. The attack on Nevel, in addition, distracted significant German forces; its success would have disrupted the enemy’s entire communications system.”

The main role in the offensive was to be played by the 3rd Shock Army. To ensure the solution to the main objective of the operation, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky included in the strike force four of the existing six rifle divisions, two of the three rifle brigades, all the tanks and almost all the artillery of the army. These forces were concentrated in a 4-kilometer area. The defense of the remaining 100-kilometer section of the army's front was entrusted to the remaining forces. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the option of deep operational formation of a strike group was chosen. The first echelon, intended to break through the German defense, included the 28th and 357th rifle divisions, reinforced by two mortar regiments. To develop success after breaking through the defense, the 78th Tank Brigade, the 21st Guards Rifle Division and three artillery regiments were assigned. The reserve (third echelon) consisted of the 46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades. The operation plan included 5 stages. At the first stage, it was necessary to secretly concentrate troops intended for the offensive in the initial areas and complete the accumulation of material resources, primarily ammunition, necessary for the operation. At the second stage, the troops quickly and secretly occupied their starting position in close proximity to the front line. The third stage included artillery preparation, attack, breaking through enemy defenses to a depth of 6-7 km to the river. Sixth, ensuring the entry into the breakthrough of the development echelon of success, which at the fourth stage, with a swift blow, was supposed to capture the inter-lake defile on the approaches to Nevel and take possession of the city. At the fifth stage, it was necessary to gain a foothold north and west of Nevel, organize a strong defense and be ready to repel counterattacks from suitable enemy reserves.

For air support of the troops, the 211th attack and 240th fighter aviation divisions were allocated from the 3rd Air Army. While the infantry was preparing for the attack, the pilots had to carry out bombing and assault strikes on strong points located in the direction of the main attack. In the future, attack aircraft, under the cover of fighters, were to ensure the advancement of the 28th Infantry Division and the breakthrough development echelon. In addition, aviation was entrusted with the task of providing air cover for the strike group, disrupting enemy railway communications in the Polotsk - Dretun and Nevel - Gorodok sections, and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Pustoshka and Vitebsk in order to timely detect suitable German reserves.

From the memoirs of A.I. Eremenko: “By the end of the day on October 5, the troops were given the last orders to attack. Its start was scheduled for 10 o'clock on October 6, 1943.

By 3 o'clock on October 6, units and subunits of the 357th and 28th rifle divisions took their starting position and dug in 300 m from the enemy trenches. The sappers were finishing making passages in the minefields and cutting the wire. The enemy set up ambushes in two passes in the 28th division’s sector; sappers and infantry cover spotted them in a timely manner and drove them off with fire.”

In the very first hours, the operation achieved a favorable result for the Red Army. A breakthrough was quickly formed, where the tanks rushed; individual pockets of stubborn resistance were suppressed by the tactical advantage of the attackers. A.I. Eremenko recalled the results of the first day of the operation: “As a result of the successful actions of our troops on the first day of the operation, units of the 263rd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions of the Nazis were driven out from the lines they occupied. The German command began hastily bringing new units from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. On October 7, units of the 58th Infantry Division appeared north of Nevel, arriving from the Krasnovaldaysk region, from the Volkhov Front sector.”

On October 8, 1943, soldiers of the 84th Rifle Corps (commander General S.A. Knyazkov) and a maneuver group led by Colonel P.F. Dremov was released by the police station. Liozno. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, five formations and units of the front were given the honorary names “Liozny”.

Commander of the Kalinin Front E.A. Eremenko writes in his memoirs: “As a result, the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 4th shock armies brilliantly completed the task assigned to them. The city of Nevel, which had been under the heel of the German occupiers since July 16, 1941, was returned to the Motherland."

Thus, on October 6, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the right-flank armies of the Kalinin Front - the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies (commanders K.M. Galitsky and V.I. Shvetsov) went on the offensive. They delivered the main attack on Vitebsk from the north through Nevel at the junction of army groups “Center” and “North”. After two days of fighting, on October 7, a large center of enemy resistance, the city of Nevel was liberated. 320 settlements were also cleared. The main evidence of the events is the memoirs of A.I. Eremenko and K.M. Galitsky, who described in detail all the nuances of the operation.

After the division took part in the defensive and offensive operations of the Battle of Kursk, it concentrated in the area of the village of Koshelev.

On August 11, 1943, the 16th Division was transferred to another operational direction, from where the road to the Lithuanian SSR opened. The division was withdrawn from combat and from the 42nd Rifle Corps. She marched to the east, passed through the places she had conquered, and concentrated in the Verkhnyaya Boevka - Sukhoe - Kholodovo area 15 kilometers northwest of Kroma in the reserve of the 48th Army of the Central Front. On August 12, she was withdrawn from the 48th Army and transferred to the reserve of the commander of the troops of the Central Front. On August 21, she departed by rail for Tula for replenishment and rest. For three weeks, being in reserve at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the division hastily prepared for new important battles, receiving reinforcements in personnel, weapons, equipment and transport.

The leaders of the republic came to the division on September 14, got acquainted with the situation, mood, and state of the division.

On September 23, the division was raised by order, loaded onto railway trains and in five days along the route Tula - Moscow - Kunya was transported to the Velikiye Luki area on the Kalinin Front, where from September 27 it was included in the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Division army (commander Major General V.I. Shvetsov (1898–1958).

During the 1943 operations to liberate Belarus and prepare for the liberation of the Baltic states, the Headquarters planned the Nevelsk operation - a strike in October 1943 at the junction of the German army groups North and Center with the forces of the 3rd and 4th shock armies.

The 4th Shock Army was supposed to advance during this operation on the right wing of the Kalinin Front. The basis of its strike force was the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General A.P. Beloborodova (1903–1990). The 16th division was included in the corps of the famous commander and took an active part in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Ezerishchenskaya operations, liberating Belarus.

At the Kunya station, the arriving echelons were quickly unloaded, the regiments, one after another, set out on foot to a position south of the village of Avenishche, where the division entered the second echelon of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps.

On October 5, 1943, Snechkus came to the division again. For the first time in his speech, there was a reminder to the soldiers that the division was already really close to Lithuania, that the Lithuanian people were waiting for the division’s fighters as liberators.

By October 8, the division was transported by rail and concentrated in the Usova-Sirotok-Ostrov area, 20 kilometers southeast of Nevel. But on October 10, the division again received orders to march and its first combat mission on the Kalinin Front. This was the order of the commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps A.P. Beloborodov, on October 11, enter the battle at Lake Ordovo, expand the occupied bridgehead, advancing in the direction of the villages of Ezerishche, Rudnya, and liberate the village of Palkino. These positions were at the forefront of the Ezerishche grouping of our troops, blocking the narrow defile between lakes Ordovo and Ezerishche, as well as the road to the city of Gorodok, Vitebsk region.

On the same day, the division went on the offensive. The 167th regiment advanced on the village of Palkino, and the 156th on Lobok and Ezerishche. The Germans, with air strikes, strong mortar and machine gun fire, using five tanks and several self-propelled guns, did not allow the offensive of our troops to develop. The advance was 200–300 meters.

At night a roundabout maneuver was undertaken. A detachment of 195 soldiers from the 1st battalion of the 249th regiment was sent behind enemy lines. The detachment bypassed the forests of lakes Melkoe and Ordovo, went to the rear of the enemy’s defense near the village of Palkino, which in the morning was to be taken by a simultaneous attack of the regiments from the front and a strike by the detachment from the rear. But the regiments that went on the attack at 8 a.m. on October 12 were unable to break through, as they suffered heavy losses from heavy fire and air strikes. The attack from the front failed. It turned out that the corps headquarters had undertaken similar maneuvers more than once before, and the Germans could have expected such actions. The detachment, which found itself surrounded, was unable to break through the front line - only 47 soldiers and officers made it through, the rest died, and some were taken prisoner. The Germans immediately shot the prisoners.

On October 17, another detachment of soldiers from the 249th regiment, numbering 317 people, went behind enemy lines; it was armed with mortars and three anti-tank guns. Communication was provided by two radio operators with walkie-talkies. The detachment had the task, bypassing Lake Ordovo, to go through the forests to the area west of Pankra. The detachment, constantly maintaining contact with the command, successfully operated in the German rear, distracting enemy forces. Having occupied the enemy trenches, the soldiers repelled the Nazi counterattacks, destroying two tanks in the process. On the fourth day, having successfully completed the task, by order of the command, the detachment returned to the regiment.

On October 18, the 167th Regiment, after many days of heavy fighting, resumed the offensive and finally took the village of Palkino.

In general, the fighting was fierce, our offensive was unsuccessful, and the enemy continually launched counterattacks. Ultimately, the command of the 4th Shock Army came to the conclusion that attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses with a frontal attack did not produce positive results. The division, by order, stopped active operations and went on the defensive, successfully repelling several fierce counterattacks of the Nazis.

The ferocity of these battles was explained by the fact that the Nazis occupied positions that were very convenient for defense. They prepared the defense here in advance, equipping the area in engineering terms: they filled it with firepower. The reason for their desperate resistance was that the Ezerishche-Ordovo interlake, where the division was breaking through, led to important road junctions - Gorodok and Vitebsk, which the German command called “the gateway to the Baltic states.”

In the second half of October 1943, the 3rd and 4th shock armies again successfully went on the offensive.

They walked through the partisan region, through forests and swamps, in the direction of Polotsk and Pustoshka (Vitebsk region). The troops advanced 70–80 km and reached the approaches to Pustoshka and the distant approaches to Polotsk.

A risky front line configuration emerged. South of Nevel, the German defense was broken through in a very short area. The neck of the breakthrough north of the town of Ezerishche remained narrow - no more than 8–9 km along the front, including the water area of lakes Nevel, Yemenets and Ordovo. It was through this narrow strip that all supplies of ammunition, fuel, and food were carried out for the two shock armies. The road was extremely vulnerable, because it was shot through not only by artillery and mortar fire, but in a number of areas by machine-gun fire from the enemy.

The German attempt to cut this road, so that the two shock armies would be in the bag, suggested itself and was only a matter of time.

Offensive battles in the Palkino-Lobok sector continued until the end of October. During this time, the division destroyed more than a thousand enemy soldiers and officers and a lot of military equipment. The enemy sought to eliminate our group that had broken through west of Nevel at any cost. The German command constantly brought reserves to the battlefield. The troops of the 4th Shock Army, and among them the 16th Lithuanian Division, built on their success south of Nevel, fighting in the difficult conditions of the lake region.

With the capture of Nevel, directions of action to Polotsk and Vitebsk were opened for the Kalinin Front. Polotsk bordered on the vast Polotsk-Lepel partisan region. The Germans considered Vitebsk “the gateway to the Baltic states.” The loss of these two cities by the Germans brought Soviet troops to positions threatening the rear of Army Groups North and Center.

The town of Gorodok is located between Nevel and Vitebsk. Here, in an attempt to prevent further advance to the west of our advancing fronts, the Germans transferred two infantry divisions, removing them from near Leningrad, where they had to stop active operations, and from the southern wing of Army Group Center - five infantry and one tank divisions . The aviation group was strengthened.

Fierce fighting continued throughout November and December 1943 north and south of Nevel and east of Vitebsk.

The division participated in these battles until October 25. Separate units of the division and its artillery were used in battles north of Vitebsk. After heavy fighting, the division was relieved on October 25 by units of the 156th Infantry Division (II Formation) and withdrawn from the front line to rest, where it was stationed in the villages of Grishkovo, Matsilishche, and Krasny Bor. During these days, units and divisions of the division received reinforcements and put themselves in order.

On October 29, it left the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and became directly subordinate to the commander of the 4th Shock Army.

The division, changing areas of concentration, by November 5, 1943, moved to the area of Vysotskoye, Ovinishte, Vashchily. The division headquarters was located in the village of Kozly, Nevelsk district (10 kilometers northeast of Ezerishche). The division was at that moment in the reserve of the 4th Shock Army. But a few days later, early in the morning of November 8, she was alerted.

The Germans struck a strong blow at the junction of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, setting themselves the task of returning Nevel, capturing the inter-lake defile, closing the corridor through which the armies were in contact with the rear, and encircling them. The danger of encirclement became very real.

In this situation, at 7:30 a.m., the chief of staff of the 4th Shock Army began to transmit an urgent order from the chief of staff of the army to the commander of the Lithuanian division: “Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our units are fighting back. The division’s task is to stop the enemy’s advance and restore the original position.” At this moment the connection was lost. The regiments were alerted and deployed in the path of the advancing German divisions.

In fulfillment of the order to counterattack the German troops advancing from the village of Lobok and restore the situation, the division itself began to advance in the direction of Shchepikha, Borok and Blinki.

At noon on November 8, the regiments of the 16th Lithuanian Division met the enemy near the villages of Terpilovo, Belina, Blinki, Borok and height 191.6. On the evening of November 8, the Germans occupied the town of Borok. At all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

The positions of the division's artillery regiment (commanded by Colonel Povilaitis Simonaitis) were located in the depths of the division's defense precisely in the direction in which the Nazis launched their attack. The advanced tanks that broke through, accompanied by infantry, unexpectedly appeared in front of the sixth battery of the regiment. When they were seen, they had already approached 500 meters. The outcome of the battle was decided in seconds, and the artillerymen instantly opened accurate fire. The first shot from Sergeant Stanislovaitis' gun knocked out the lead tank. The second tank exploded from artillery fire, after which the third tank disappeared from sight. Following this, the battery fired at the infantry, causing heavy losses. The artillerymen of the neighboring battery had to fight off tanks and infantry that came close to its firing positions with grenades. The fourth battery managed to knock out several enemy tanks, but suffered heavy losses. However, the Germans were unable to break through to the north here either.

Subsequent attacks by enemy tanks and infantry against the positions of the Lithuanian division were repelled with heavy losses for the Germans. In all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

On November 9, the 167th Regiment (regiment commander Colonel Vladas Moteka) took the town of Borok from the Germans.

Sergei Kostyukovich, a participant in this battle who became a Belarusian academician after the war, recalls how V. Moteka behaved during the moments of repelling German counterattacks near the town of Borok: “He rode on a white horse from one battalion to another and in the most dramatic situations, maintaining a calm expression faces, encouraged the fighters with his whole appearance, as if saying: “Don’t be afraid, guys, be bold!”

During stubborn defensive battles from November 8 to 11, near the southern shore of the lake. Zaverezhye - Beliny - Borok - Blinky the division defended itself for four days, resorting to counterattacks and bayonet strikes, in fierce battles when the Germans even tried to resort to psychic attacks.

The situation developed in such a way that, due to the fierceness of the fighting, the rear divisions were unable to deliver food to the soldiers at the front lines, and the soldiers were left without food for several days.

The task assigned to the division was completed, and the original position of our defense was restored on this section of the front.

In these defensive battles, the division inflicted heavy losses on the enemy (up to 3 thousand people), held the line of defense, knocked out and burned 12 tanks. The Germans also lost many artillery pieces and vehicles and were driven back to their original positions. Together with other formations, the Lithuanian division thwarted the plan to encircle our 3rd and 4th armies. The situation on the isthmus was corrected thanks to the exceptional heroism of the tank destroyer regiment and three rifle divisions, including the 16th Lithuanian, which not only stopped the enemy’s advance towards Nevel, but also destroyed more than 10 thousand of his soldiers.

In these battles, the artillerymen of the 224th artillery regiment, who occupied positions in the sector of the 167th regiment between lakes Ordovo and Ezerische, especially distinguished themselves in the Lithuanian division. Under pressure from advancing German troops, the 167th Regiment was forced to retreat and take up new positions. The artillerymen of the 224th regiment, left for some time without infantry cover, held their positions and continued to fire.

Having honorably held its positions and covered the defenseless communications of the advancing armies, the division ensured further strategic success and saved the general situation on the front scale.

The enemy, having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive. 175 soldiers and officers were awarded for courage and heroism shown in battle. The front commander expressed gratitude to all the personnel of the division.

On the night of November 12, the Lithuanian formation was withdrawn from the front line. Only the 224th Artillery Regiment and artillery units of the rifle regiments were left in firing positions. At the positions, the small rifle units of the 16th division were replaced by soldiers of the 29th division (third formation).

Military cemeteries along the Nevel-Gorodok highway and a memorial stone near the road on the hill in Dubische near the lake remained as a reminder of the cost of the victories that marked the division’s combat path. Here stands a monument to the fallen soldiers of the 16th Lithuanian Division, erected by its veterans after the war.

5 o'clock in the morning. Reconnaissance in force, in order to clarify the location of firing points of the enemy's front line, to detect artillery and mortar firing positions.

In reconnaissance in force in the breakthrough area, there are two rifle companies - one from each division of the first echelon.

7 o'clock. The artillery began control shooting.

8 hours 40 minutes. Artillery preparation, fire to destroy enemy fortifications. 800 artillery and mortar barrels took part in it.

9 hours 55 minutes. A salvo of fire from two Katyusha regiments. The artillery transfers fire to the enemy's second trench. The 211th Assault Aviation Division launches a massive bombing attack on fascist strongholds at the front line, then in the immediate depths of the defense.

10 hours. The order is to start attacking. The signal for the attack is one word “Volga”. At the same time, at the front line, red and green rockets are soaring over the entire breakthrough area, and signalers are playing in companies and battalions, calling for battle.

11 o'clock. We have two enemy strongholds in our hands. During the first attack, the greatest success was achieved by the 88th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Likhobabina. 144th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel F.A. Golenkov breaks into the Varsakovo stronghold.

The breakthrough area has been expanded to 2.5 km along the front and 2 km in depth.

12 hours 20 minutes. Green rockets take off above the column of the breakthrough development echelon - a signal for an offensive. To liberate the city of Nevel, the 78th Tank Brigade of Colonel Ya.G. moved. Kochergin, with a landing of machine gunners on board. Following them in vehicles was the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment, headed by Lieutenant Colonel N.M. Chebotarev.

16 hours. Tank battalions with a landing of machine gunners, having destroyed a group of Nazis in a short battle on the outskirts, entered Nevel. The first to break into the city was a tank company of the 263rd battalion, commanded by Captain Markov. The tank of deputy battalion commander E.S. was rapidly moving ahead. Pirozhnikova. Having reached the center, Captain Pirozhnikov and Red Army soldier Ovchinnikov hoisted a red banner on the building of the City Council.

Following the tanks, units of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment, commanded by Major V.N., entered the city. Soloviev and captain P.A. Rybin.

Some of the tanks occupied the railway station. 1,600 people who were in 2 echelons were freed from deportation into fascist captivity.

16 hours 40 minutes. Radiogram from Colonel Ya.G. Kochergina reports that Nevel has been taken and that small groups of the enemy are being cleared.

21 hours 55 minutes. The city of Nevel is finally cleared of Nazi invaders. Up to 600 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed, about 400 prisoners were captured.

Expansion of the breakthrough, entry of the main forces into the area north and west of Nevel.

31st Rifle Brigade under the command of Colonel L.A. Bakuev, expands the breakthrough to 10-12 km, goes to the area of the village of Barsuki. occupies the border of the lake. Yemenets.

28th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovich, expands the breakthrough in the northern direction. It goes out to the border of the village of Busolovo.

46th Rifle Division under the command of General S.I. Karapetyan reaches the border of the village of Syrokvashino, expanding the breakthrough to 20-25 km. along the front.